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Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The 
Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma 
Some thirty years ago in the landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois 1 
Justice Hugo Black declared that "[t]here can be no equal justice 
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he 
has."2 Since that decision, the rights of indigent defendants in the 
criminal justice system3 have received frequent attention from the 
Supreme Court. Griffin established the right to a free trial transcript 
for appeal. Subsequent cases required the waiver of a filing fee for 
appeals,4 and established the right to state-supplied counsel at trial,5 
on appeal, 6 in misdemeanor cases, 7 and, under some circumstances, in 
probation revocation hearings. 8 
Even when an indigent defendant is provided with counsel, how-
ever, justice is not always done. As Judge Jerome Frank of the Second 
Circuit pointed out in an often-quoted passage, it may also be vital 
that the defendant have access to the assistance of experts or 
investigators: 
The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused per-
son if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense, 
1. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
2. 351 U.S. at 19. 
3. In 1971, according to F.B.I. reports, of some seven million adult felony and nontraffic 
misdemeanor arrests in the United States, almost 3.4 million of the defendants were indigent and 
required appointed counsel. N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 3 n.4 
(1982). In 1963, the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Fed· 
eral Criminal Justice cited estimates that about sixty percent of the defendants in state and fed-
eral courts were unable to afford counsel. REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE 
ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter cited as POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE]. Another estimate is that "[i]n 
most jurisdictions, approximately 60-70 percent of all felony defendants and 30-40 percent of all 
misdemeanor defendants will be classified as indigent." H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 279 (J. Israel 2d ed. 1979). 
4. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court first recognized a right to state· 
supplied counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Decided under the "fundamental 
fairness" analysis of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, Powell did not create a 
systematic right to appointed counsel for all indigent defendants. That was made clear a decade 
later by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (lack of counsel did not result in denial of due 
process where no special circumstances made counsel necessary). Meanwhile, Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458 (1938), had established the right to appointed counsel in federal cases under the 
sixth amendment. It was this sixth amendment right which the Court applied to the states in 
Gideon as part of the "selective incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth 
amendment. 
6. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), limited 
this right to those misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is actually imposed. 
8. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
1326 
May 1986) Note - Expert Services 1327 
e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a piv-
otal missing witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert ac-
countant or mining engineer or chemist .... In such circumstances, if the 
government does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor - and 
represents but an upper-bracket privilege.9 
And as early as 1929 Justice (then Chief Judge) Benjamin Cardozo 
had noted that "upon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or 
forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for de-
fense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is 
unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of 
those against him."10 It will hardly be disputed that, as society and 
the legal system have come increasingly to rely on science, the impor-
tance of the expert11 has only become greater. 
The gradual expansion of the rights of indigent defendants, espe-
cially during the 1960s, increasingly brought with it, therefore, the 
recognition that one right essential to a fair trial was that of the assis-
tance of nonlawyer experts in appropriate cases.12 On the federal 
level, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,13 following the recommenda-
tion of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Admin-
istration of Federal Criminal Justice, 14 provided for "investigative, 
expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense." 15 The 
American Bar Association used much the same language in its 1968 
Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services. 16 Scholarly com-
9. United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
10. Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929). 
11. As used in this Note, the term "expert" includes not only the professional who testifies at 
trial as an expert witness, but also other nonlawyers, such as investigators, who assist in the 
development of information or planning of strategy in the pretrial and trial stages. 
12. The problem for indigents is magnified by the difficulty of obtaining expert services on a 
pro bono basis. According to the director of a Florida volunteer defender organization: "Compe-
tent lawyers often volunteer their help, but psychiatrists rarely do. Over the years, I have found 
hundreds of attorneys who have been willing to volunteer millions of dollars of their time to these 
defendants. I have found only three free shrinks .... " Sherrill, In Florida, Insanity is No 
Defense, 239 NATION 537, 555 (1984) (quoting Scharlette Holdman, of the Florida Clearing 
House for Justice). 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982). 
14. The "Allen Committee," so called after its chairperson Professor Francis A. Allen, con-
cluded that in many federal cases "the provision of adequate representation requires that a range 
of services, in addition to the appointment of counsel, be made available to the defense. These 
services include those of pre-trial investigation and those of experts such as psychiatrists, ac-
countants, and other specialists." POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 
3, at 39. 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982). On the practical operation of the statute, see generally 
Oaks, Obtaining Compensation and Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Justice Act, in 1 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES ch. 7 (R. Cipes ed. 1969). The question of when such services 
are "necessary" is discussed in Part V infra. 
16. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES§ 1.5 (1968). The ABA's 
Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions, which drew up these standards, 
was chaired by then Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger. Essentially the same standard is carried 
over into the ABA's 1980 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980). 
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mentators nearly unanimously called for recognition of the indigent's 
constitutional right to expert assistance where necessary. 17 And most 
states, either by statute or judicial decision, provided for expert serv-
ices in certain circumstances.18 
Curiously, however, the Supreme Court maintained a thirty-two 
year silence on the issue. Its ambiguous 1953 decision in United States 
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi19 remained its final word on the question until 
1985.20 While in the late 1960s and early 1970s the rapid expansion of 
the Griffin equal protection principle21 made it appear virtually inevi-
table that the constitutional right to appointed experts would soon be 
recognized,22 the Burger Court "put on the brakes"23 in 1974 with its 
decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 24 refusing to recognize a constitutional 
17. See, e.g., Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional 
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 CIN. L. R.Ev. 574 (1982); Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent 
Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS 
L.J. 647 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational 
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 632 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense]; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counselfor Indigent 
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Aid]; 
Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent Psychiatrist, 7 TULSA L.J. 137 
(1971); Note, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 481 [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert]; Comment, Assistance in Addi-
tion to Counsel for Indigent Defendants: The Need For; The Lack Of; The Right To, 16 VILL. L. 
REV. 323 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counsel]. 
18. For a list of relevant statutes and cases from forty-one states, see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985); see also N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 3, at apps. B, C, D (surveying state 
provisions for defense services); Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric 
Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 965-67 (1985) (discussing variations in statutory 
schemes). 
19. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). Relying on McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951), the 
Baldi Court rejected the claim that the state had a constitutional duty to appoint a psychiatrist to 
make a pretrial examination of the defendant. The Court emphasized, however, that in the case 
before it a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant and testified as to his sanity 
at the time of the offense. 344 U.S. at 568. Thus, it is not clear whether under Baldi an indigent 
defendant had no right at all of access to a psychiatric expert, or whether such a right was merely 
limited to an examination by a "neutral" expert. Baldi, in any case, was decided well before the 
Court began its systematic expansion of the rights of indigent defendants. It was certainly "se-
verely undercut" by the Court's decisions after Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See 
Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1390 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J.). 
20. In 1963 the Court granted certiorari on this question in Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 
(1963), only to remand the case when Texas provided a psychiatric examination and offered to 
grant the defendant a new trial. Eighteen years later the question was again presented by a 
petition for certiorari in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 20-22, Eddings. In granting certiorari, however, the Court limited consideration to 
another issue presented by the petitioner. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981) (granting 
certiorari). While the Supreme Court was silent, numerous state and lower federal courts dealt 
with the issue of expert services for indigent defendants - with a wide range of results. See 
Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & Supp. 1985). 
21. See text at notes 64-65 infra. 
22. See Kamisar, Poverty, Equality and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois and 
Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1-79, 1-94 (1977). 
23. Id. at 1-97. 
24. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
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right to appointed counsel for discretionary review by a state supreme 
court.25 
A decade later, the break.through on the issue of the indigent de-
fendant's constitutional right to state-supplied expert services may 
have come with the Court's 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma. 26 In 
an opinion joined by all but two Justices,27 the Court held that an 
indigent defendant whose sanity at the time of the offense is to be a 
significant factor at trial is entitled to the assistance of a state-supplied 
psychiatrist for his defense.28 
This Note attempts to define the boundaries of the indigent crimi-
nal defendant's constitutional right to expert assistance, in the light of 
Ake v. Oklahoma. Part I briefly reviews the Ake decision and exam-
ines its constitutional background. Part II inquires into Ake's implica-
tions for experts other than psychiatrists and in contexts other than 
the insanity defense, arguing that the principles that guided the Ake 
decision have validity well beyond the facts of that case. Part III asks 
whether the Ake doctrine should be limited to capital cases. Rejecting 
such a limitation, it concludes that the right to expert assistance 
should extend as far as the right to counsel. Part IV examines the role 
of the expert, arguing that she must be a "defense consultant" rather 
than a "neutral expert." Part V addresses the threshold showing a 
defendant must make in order to obtain access to an expert, proposing 
several tests under which the right to expert assistance can be 
evaluated. 
I. AKE AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
A. Ake v. Oklahoma 
Glen Burton Ake was tried and convicted in the District Court of 
Canadian County, Oklahoma, for the brutal and senseless murder of a 
husband and wife and the wounding of their two children. Captured 
along with his accomplice in Colorado a month after the crime, Ake 
made a detailed, forty-four page confession. The "facts" of the case 
were thus not in dispute. 29 The only issue at trial was Ake's sanity. 
25. See Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-97 to 1-110. On Moffitt, see notes 66-73 infra and 
accompanying text. 
26. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
27. See note 54 infra. 
28. 470 U.S. at 83. For further discussion of the Ake decision, see notes 29-55 infra and 
accompanying text. 
29. In his dissenting opinion Justice Rehnquist describes the crime in some detail. 470 U.S. 
at 88. Rehnquist's account, excerpted from Oklahoma's Supreme Court brief, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 3-10, Ake, was apparently aimed at portraying the robbery and murder as a ration-
ally planned act ("Petitioner Ake and his codefendant Hatch quit their jobs on an oil field rig in 
October 1979, borrowed a car, and went looking for a location to burglarize." 470 U.S. at 88), to 
support his argument that there was no doubt as to Ake's sanity. See 470 U.S. at 90-91. 
Whatever the horror of the crime, however, it is doubtful that it simply resulted from a rational 
calculus. Ake's confession makes clear that he committed the crime under the influence of con-
1330 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1326 
At arraignment, the judge found Ake's behavior so "bizarre" that 
he ordered sua sponte a psychiatric examination.3° Following a 
month-long state hospital examination of his competency to stand 
trial, Ake was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic,31 held incompe-
tent to stand trial, and committed to the state hospital. Six weeks 
later, however, he had been rendered competent through massive 
doses of the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. 32 
At a pretrial conference, Ake's court-appointed attorney an-
nounced his intention to raise a defense of insanity. During his three 
months at the state hospital, Ake had never been examined with re-
gard to his sanity at the time of the offense; because he was indigent, 
his attorney asked the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist for such an 
examination. Relying on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 33 the 
court rejected the request. 34 At trial, Ake's counsel called three psy-
chiatrists who had examined the defendant; none of them, however, 
siderable quantities of cocaine, marijuana, whiskey, and beer he consumed that day, apparently 
as a result of an emotional crisis set off by his girlfriend's desertion. See Brief of Respondent, 
app. A at 3a-50a; cf. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 
133 n.20 (1985) (arguing that Rehnquist misunderstood the nature of Ake's illness, and that 
Ake's "apparent coherence after the crime was consistent with the diagnosis of chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia") [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1984 Term]. 
30. Information on the pretrial and trial proceedings is drawn from Ake, 410 U.S. at 70-73. 
31. At Ake's competency hearing, the examining psychiatrist testified that Ake was 
a psychotic ... his psychiatric diagnosis was that of paranoid schizophrenia - chronic, with 
exacerbation, that is with current upset, and that in addition • • • he is dangerous. • • • 
[B]ecause of the severity of his mental illness and because of the intensities of his rage, his 
poor control, his delusions, he requires a maximum security facility within - I believe -
the State Psychiatric Hospital system. 
470 U.S. at 71. 
32. Apparently because of the drug treatment, Ake stared vacantly ahead throughout the 
trial, remaining mute and refusing to speak with his attorneys. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okin. 
Crim. App. 1983). Ake also challenged, before the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of try-
ing him while so drugged, but the Court did not reach this question in its decision. See 410 U.S. 
at 74 n.2. 
33. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra. 
34. 470 U.S. at 72. The court's decision was fully in accord with Oklahoma law, which did 
not allow trial courts any discretion to provide funds for defense experts. See Amicus Curiae 
Brief of the Public Defender of Oklahoma County et al. at 4-9, Ake. That not only defense 
attorneys but also some Oklahoma courts questioned the constitutionality of this practice is indi· 
cated by the following colloquy, from a 1982 case, on a defense motion for an independent psy· 
chological evaluation: 
THE COURT: You can't hire •.. investigators and you can't hire experts and all that 
and you talked me into - one day of ruling that again. And I think you're right on the law. 
And I knew - I know you're right. 
But the trouble of it is, there's three fellows out there on the State Capitol that say that 
that's not the law. And you took it out there and they overruled •.. me •..• And I think 
they're flirting with dynamite .... 
. . . Be overruled .... 
MR. RAVITZ: For the record, Judge, I would like to state that I don't have any funds. 
My client's indigent .... 
THE COURT: Well, for whatever its [sic] worth, Ravitz ..• I agreed with you a year 
ago, I agree with you now ...• 
. . . I cannot legally give you those funds. And what the Supreme Court of the United 
States is going to say about it one of these days is another ball game. But I can't do 
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was able to testify on the issue of Ake's sanity at the time of the of-
fense. Thus, Ake was able to present no expert testimony in support 
of his defense ofinsanity.35 The jury rejected his claim of insanity and 
found him guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the 
prosecution relied on testimony elicited from the psychiatrists, on 
cross-examination during the guilt phase, that Ake was a danger to 
society. Ake was able to present no expert evidence to rebut this testi-
mony. He was sentenced to death.36 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ake's convic-
tion and death sentence, 37 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Justice Marshall based his opinion for the Court on "the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness."38 Af-
ter tracing the Court's decisions expanding the rights of indigent de-
fendants over thirty years, 39 Marshall concluded that the state had an 
obligation to supply the indigent defendant with the "basic tools of an 
that. And the Court of Criminal Appeals told me that you can't do this. I've got to follow 
them .... 
THE COURT: You've got to convince them [the Court of Criminal Appeals] out there. 
That's who you've got to convince. 
MR. RAVITZ: I've tried. 
THE COURT: Take it on up to the Supreme Court of the United States .... 
Id. at app. B. 
35. While Oklahoma theoretically admitted lay testimony on the issue of insanity, the use of 
the M'Naghten "right-wrong" test, as well as a presumption of sanity which the defendant could 
overcome only by making a prima facie case oflegal insanity, combined to render lay testimony 
virtually useless. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Public Defender of Oklahoma County et al. at 
10-17, Ake (citing cases); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 
TULSA L.J. 121, 136-41 (1985) (citing cases). In light of this consistent Oklahoma practice of 
finding lay testimony insufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity, Justice Rehnquist's 
dissenting remark that Ake had called no lay witnesses to testify on his sanity, 470 U.S. at 90, is 
particularly inapt. 
For a more general discussion of the difficulty of establishing insanity by lay testimony, see A. 
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 124-25 (1967) ("In practical terms, a successful defense 
without expert testimony will be made only in cases so extreme, or so compelling in sympathy for 
the defendant, that the prosecutor is unlikely to bring them at all."). 
36. 470 U.S. at 72-73. 
37. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The court rejected nineteen defense 
exceptions, including Ake's claim that he had a right to a court-appointed psychiatrist. Its com-
plete discussion of the issue was as follows: "We have held numerous times that, the unique 
nature of capital cases notwithstanding, the State does not have the responsibility of providing 
such services to indigents charged with capital crimes. Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Oki. Cr. 
1980); and cases cited therein." 663 P.2d at 6. 
38. 470 U.S. at 76. Because it was able to decide the issue on due process grounds, the Court 
did not examine the applicability of the equal protection clause or the sixth amendment. 470 
U.S. at 87 n.13. 
39. The Court cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a trial transcript for 
appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fee for appeal must be waived); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963) (right to counsel on first direct appeal as of right); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) 
(assistance of counsel must be effective); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (same); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (same); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 
(1981) (right to state-paid blood tests in a "quasi-criminal" paternity action). 
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adequate defense or appeal."40 To determine whether access to a psy-
chiatrist was such a "basic tool," the Court applied the familiar three-
prong balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 41 The Mathews test con-
siders (1) the "private interest" which would be affected by the state's 
action, (2) the "governmental interest" affected by application of the 
additional safeguard, and (3) "the probable value of the additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards ~re 
not provided."42 
The Court disposed summarily of the first two factors. The crimi-
nal defendant's interest in his life or liberty was "almost uniquely com-
40. 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). 
41. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews test is used essentially in administrative law, and 
its application to criminal cases is rare. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) 
(pretrial detention of juveniles); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (prison disciplinary 
procedures); see also the "quasi-criminal" case of Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (pater-
nity action). Ake breaks new ground in using the Mathews test in the context of' a criminal trial. 
The Mathews approach of using a balancing test to take account of the cost of due process 
protections is controversial. For criticism of Mathews, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due 
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors i11 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 28 (1976); Rubin, Due Process a11d the Admi11is-
trative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1136-44 (1984). On the dangers inherent in any balancing 
test, due to the easy manipulability of the factors to be balanced and the difficulty of comparing 
them, see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Frantz, 
Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Me11delson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 746-49 
(1963). As Professor Rubin has pointed out, "The Court's frequent answer is to 'balance' or 
'weigh' the various factors. This reliance upon 'weight,' which is a useful approach for dealing 
with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are con-
cerned." Rubin, supra, at 1138. On the other hand, due process concepts may be more amenable 
to the balancing of various interests, including the cost to society. A classic characterization 
notes that due process "at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in 
the light of then existing values and capabilities." Schaefer, Federalism and State Crimi11al Pro· 
cedure, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. l, 6 (1956) (emphasis added). Such an understanding of due process 
would seem to invite weighing the burden on society, in determining what process is due in a 
given situation. Generally, the Court has indeed been more willing to take account of costs when 
the more open-ended clauses of the Constitution are involved. See W. LAFAVE & J, ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.8(d) (1985). 
In the area of indigent defendants' rights, an increased willingness to consider cost appears to 
be part of the Court's general retreat from Griffin-Douglas equal protection doctrine; see notes 
66-73 infra and accompanying text. Compare Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 
(1971) ("Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests 
of society ...• The State's fiscal interest is ... irrelevant."), with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 
373 (1979) ("[A]ny extension [of the right to counsel] would create confusion and impose unpre-
dictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States."). See also Elson, Bala11ci11g 
Costs in Constitutional Construction: The Burger Court's Expansive New Approach, 17 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 160, 183-86 (1979). Justice Stevens has argued that the Mathews balancing test is 
appropriate only to property cases and has no place where a deprivation of liberty is involved. 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even 
if one accepts this view, however, Ake's introduction of the Mathews analysis into the area of 
criminal law may be a positive step when compared to Scott - which considered costs as an 
absolute value and refused to balance them against the interests of the individual defendant. See 
Elson, supra, at 184; Nowak, Foreword - Due Process Methodology in the Posti11corporatio11 
World, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 408-09 (1979). 
42. 470 U.S. at 77. 
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pelling,"43 while the state's fiscal interest in denying the defendant the 
assistance of a psychiatrist was "not substantial," both in absolute 
terms44 and "in light of the compelling interest of both the State and 
the individual in accurate dispositions."45 The bulk of the Court's dis-
cussion was devoted to the third prong, focusing on "the pivotal role 
that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings"46 and the 
important functions performed for the defense by a psychiatric ex-
pert. 47 It found that "the potential accuracy of the jury's determina-
tion is . . . dramatically enhanced" by the provision of a psychiatric 
expert for the defense. 48 Given this determination, as well as the state 
and individual interests in accurate proceedings, the opinion con-
cluded that "the State's interest in its fisc must yield."49 Thus, the 
Court held that 
when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the 
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a 
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who 
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, prepa-
ration, and presentation of the defense. 50 
Turning to the special case of the sentencing phase in a capital 
proceeding, the Court held that "when the State presents psychiatric 
evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness" as an aggravating 
factor, it must provide him with "access to a psychiatric examination 
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assis-
tance in preparation at the sentencing phase."51 
Finally, the Court addressed its thirty-two year old precedent of 
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 52 so often invoked to deny an 
indigent defendant's right to expert assistance. First distinguishing 
Baldi on the grounds that in that case "neutral psychiatrists" had in 
fact examined the defendant and testified to his sanity, the Court went 
on virtually to overrule Baldi: 
[O]ur disagreement with the State's reliance on [Baldi] is more funda-
mental. That case was decided at a time when indigent defendants in 
43. 470 U.S. at 78. 
44. The Court noted that the federal government and many states already provided psychiat-
ric assistance for indigent defendants. 470 U.S. at 78 & n.4 (citing statutes and judicial decisions 
of 41 states). 
45. 470 U.S. at 79. 
46. 470 U.S. at 79. 
47. 470 U.S. at 80-82 
48. 470 U.S. at 83. 
49. 470 U.S. at 83. 
50. 470 U.S. at 83. The Court limited its holding, however, by specifying that the defendant 
was not entitled to a psychiatrist of his choice, and that implementation of the right to a psychia-
trist would be left to the states. 470 U.S. at 83. On this issue, see notes 183-89 infra and accom-
panying text. 
51. 470 U.S. at 83-84 .. 
52. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra. 
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state courts had no constitutional right to even the presence of coun-
sel. ... [A]nd we would surely be remiss to ignore the extraordinarily 
enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today. Shifts in all these 
areas since the time of [Baldi] convince us that the opinion in that case 
was addressed to altogether different variables, and that we are not lim-
ited by it in considering whether fundamental fairness today requires a 
different result. s3 
Applying its discussion to the facts of the case, the Court con-
cluded that the denial of a state-supplied psychiatrist at both the guilt 
and sentencing phases had deprived the defendant of due process. It 
reverseds4 and remanded for a new tria1.ss 
B. The Constitutional Bases of Ake v. Oklahoma 
Judicial decisions recognizing the rights of indigent defendants 
have drawn their constitutional bases from several sources: the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as 
well as the right to counsel and other provisions of the sixth amend-
ment. Due process, on which Ake was based, has until recently been a 
relatively little-used doctrine in the area of indigents' rights.s6 As Ake 
demonstrates, however, it may be of increasing importance with the 
Court's apparent reluctance in recent years to apply equal protection 
analysis. s7 
The most important cases based on due process, the "least frozen 
53. 470 U.S. at 85 (footnote omitted). 
54. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Pow-
ell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, arguing in a brief 
opinion that the Court's holding applied only to capital cases. 470 U.S. at 87; see Part III infra. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that (1) the right to psychiatric assistance should exist only 
in capital cases; (2) the defendant should be entitled only "to an independent psychiatric evalua-
tion, not to a defense consultant," 470 U.S. at 87; and (3) on the facts of the case, there had been 
no showing that Ake's sanity at the time of the offense was seriously in question. 470 U.S. at 87-
92. 
55. On remand Ake was again convicted of murder, despite the testimony of a defense psy-
chiatrist who diagnosed him as "a paranoid schizophrenic who had been hearing voices since 
1973." This time, however, the jury imposed only a sentence oflife imprisonment. N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 14, 1986, at 15, col. 1 (late ed.). 
The Oklahoma legislature responded to Ake by passing emergency legislation which (1) re-
quires courts to provide a defense psychiatrist in insanity cases, and (2) grants the courts discre-
tion to provide other kinds of defense experts - but only in capital cases. 1985 Okla. Sess. Law 
Serv. 1034-35 (West); see also O'Malley v. Layden, 702 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) 
(holding funds for defense "experts" - with no apparent limitation to insanity or capital cases 
- to be payable from the court fund). 
56. While Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963), can be seen in part as based on due process, see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-05 
(1985); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974), an examination of some of their progeny, 
which go beyond the minimum requirements of "fundamental fairness," makes clear that the 
dominant idea of Griffin and Douglas is the "equality principle." See, e.g., Britt v. North Caro-
lina, 404 U.S. 226 (1972); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 
U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966). 
57. See notes 66-73 infra and accompanying text. 
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concept of our law,"58 antedate the "selective incorporation" of most 
of the Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment and 
their systematic application to the states. 59 Thus, the early right-to-
counsel cases of Powell v. Alabama60 and Betts v. Brady,61 which to-
day62 would be decided on the basis of the sixth amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel, were based on the notion that due process 
required, as a matter of "fundamental fairness," the appointment of 
counsel - but only on a case-by-case basis, when special circum-
stances were present. Subsequent to the incorporation of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel, the due process clause has been used to 
establish the right to counsel in phases of the criminal justice process 
where the sixth amendment does not apply, such as in probation revo-
cation proceedings. 63 
A second constitutional basis for the rights of indigent defendants 
has been the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The 
landmark decisions of Griffin v. lllinois64 and Douglas v. California 65 
seemed to impose on the state an "affirmative duty," going beyond the 
minimum essentials of due process, to reduce, if not eliminate, the im-
pact of poverty on a defendant's fate in the criminal justice system. 
With its 1974 decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 66 however, the Court effec-
tively emasculated equal protection as a constitutional basis for indi-
58. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
59. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§§ 2.2 to 2.5. 
60. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
61. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
62. Le., since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see text at notes 74-75 infra. 
63. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Court in Gagnon ~ntinued the "fun-
damental fairness" approach of Powell and Betts by recognizing the right to counsel only on a 
case-by-case basis, where counsel was necessary due to the particular circumstances of the case. 
See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 11.l(b). In this respect Ake v. Oklahoma may 
mark a departure in "fundamental fairness" analysis under the due process clause by laying 
down a per se rule that the assistance of a psychiatrist is required in all cases where the defendant 
has made the threshold showing that her sanity will be a significant factor at trial, rather than 
leaving the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a psychiatrist is necessary to funda-
mental fairness. 
While the advantage of a Powell-Betts-Gagnon case-by-case approach is allegedly its flexibil-
ity, in fact the resistance of lower courts to procedural safeguards frequently leads to a most 
inflexible standard, so that the requirements for application of the safeguard are virtually never 
found. In Gideon, for example, the trial court did not apply the Betts "special circumstances" 
approach, but rather followed a flat rule that appointed counsel was to be supplied only in capital 
cases. 372 U.S. at 337. A better approach is thereforeAke's per se rule. Compare, in the ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases, Judge Bazelon's advocacy of per se rules. See United States v. 
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See generally W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 2.8(c). 
For a survey of pre-Ake lower court cases on expert services decided under the due process 
clause, see Decker, supra note 17, at 581-86. 
64. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that the state provide the defendant with a trial transcript 
where this is necessary for the filing of an appeal). 
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring appointed counsel on the first direct appeal as of right). 
66. 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (denying a right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal). It 
is perhaps more than a coincidence that Moffitt came only a year after the Court had held in San 
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gents' rights independent of the due process clause.67 Essentially 
adopting the position which Justice Harlan had advocated in his Grif-
fin 68 and Douglas 69 dissents, Moffitt, as Professor Kamisar points out, 
"does not measure the gap between respondent and a wealthy defen-
dant in respondent's circumstances as much as it measures respon-
dent's opportunity to present his claim ... against some fixed standard 
.... "
70 More recent cases confirm the Court's tendency to rely on due 
process rather than on equal protection analysis in indigents' rights 
cases.71 And to the extent that an equal protection approach is still 
used, its reach seems to be defined by the due process requirement of 
"fundamental fairness."72 The Ake decision, by its reliance on due 
process analysis to define the rights of indigent defendants, only rein-
forces this abandonment of equal protection doctrine.73 
A final constitutional source of the rights of indigent defendants is 
the sixth amendment. Not only the right to counsel, but also the right 
to compulsory process of witnesses and the confrontation clause, can 
be invoked in support of the indigent defendant's right to expert assis-
tance. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 74 the Supreme Court recognized that the 
sixth amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel meant that 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that wealth was not a "suspect 
classification" for purposes of the equal protection clause. 
67. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118-19 (1978); Kamisar, supra note 
22, at 1-97 to 1-110. It had been suggested as early as 1963 that the Griffin-Doug/as line of cases 
turned essentially on a "fundamental fairness" analysis, barring only "discriminations based on 
wealth [which] produce such great disparity in effectiveness that they are fundamentally unfair, 
thus violating due process." Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1072. Such a view, which 
denies "that every inequality violates due process," id., is difficult to reconcile with several subse-
quent cases in the Griffin-Douglas line, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (ordi-
narily, right to trial transcript for use at retrial); Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (right to 
transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial, without indication of need). See Kamisar, supra 
note 22, at 1-93 to 1-96. 
68. 351 U.S. at 34-36. 
69. 372 U.S. at 361-63. 
70. Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-104 (emphasis deleted). "The duty of the State under our 
cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant 
... , but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims 
fairly .... " Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 616. In other words, "[u]nder [Moffitt], indigent defendants ..• 
are guaranteed only 'adequate,' not equal, access to the judicial system." 49 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 191, 207 (1980). For a view that Moffitt did not significantly limit the Griffin-Doug/as 
doctrine, see Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 
75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1334-36 & n.69 (1977). 
71. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-05 (1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-
67 (1983). 
72. See Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-107 to 1-109. "The 'equality' principle once loomed as 
an awesome weapon, one with almost unlimited range, but- now that Moffitt is on the books -
on many procedural frontiers this once treasured weapon may add nothing to what the indigent 
defendant or prisoner already has in his legal arsenal." Id. at 1-109 (emphasis in original). 
73. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 29, at 137-40. For a survey of pre-Ake 
lower court cases on expert services decided on the basis of equal protection, see Decker, supra 
note 17, at 586-90. 
74. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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the state must appoint counsel for criminal defendants financially un-
able to retain their own. Gideon v. Wainwright75 "incorporated" this 
element of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment, thus 
making it applicable to the states. As early as Powell v. Alabama76 the 
Court recognized that the assistance of counsel must be "effective," 
and a number of state and lower federal courts have found in this right 
to effective assistance of counsel the source of a constitutional require-
ment that indigent defendants be provided with the assistance of ex-
perts. 77 One post.,Ake case, whose facts bear a certain resemblance to 
those in Ake, has been decided on the basis of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel doctrine. 78 
At least one state case has derived a right to expert assistance from 
the sixth amendment right to the compulsory process of witnesses. 79 
No case support, on the other hand, exists for a confrontation clause 
right to expert assistance, but one commentator has argued that 
"[e]xpert assistance and investigative preparation ... seem necessary 
to preserve 'the defendant's . . . right to a fair trial as affected by his 
right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him.' " 80 A 
confrontation clause right to expert assistance would be particularly 
helpful in identifying the expert's constitutionally required role. 81 The 
requirement that the expert assist counsel in the preparation of cross-
examination, the essence of any confrontation clause right, would help 
to anchor the expert's role as that of a defense consultant. 
75. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
76. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
77. See Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Decoster, 
624 F.2d 196, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967); Bush 
v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), ajfd., 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965); 
Decker, supra note 17, at 593-99; Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17, at 495-96; 
Note, Criminal Procedure - An Indigent's Constitutional Right to a State-Paid Expert - Wil-
liams v. Martin, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1031, 1035-37 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
State-Paid Expert]. 
78. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 374 (1985). In 
Blake, the prosecution withheld from the examining psychiatrist a revealing taped confession and 
a letter by the defendant; as a result the psychiatrist was unable effectively to examine the defen-
dant. The similarity to Ake lies in the fact that the challenged state conduct made it impossible 
for the examining psychiatrist to form an opinion about the defendant's sanity at the time of the 
offense. 758 F.2d at 528; cf Ake, 470 U.S. at 72 .. 
79. People v. Watson, 36 III. 2d 228, 221 N.E. 2d 645 (1966). The court held that the defen-
dant in a forgery case was entitled to the expert assistance of a document examiner; funds were to 
be made available not only for the expense of presenting the expert witness at trial, but also for 
preliminary investigations related to the development of a defense. See Decker, supra note 17, at 
590-93; Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17, at 496-97; Note, State-Paid Expert, 
supra note 77, at 1037-38. Watson has not been followed outside Illinois. See Decker, supra note 
17, at 591-93, and cases cited therein. 
80. Note, Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense, supra note 17, at 643 (quoting United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added by cited Note)). 
81. See Part IV infra. 
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II. EXPERTS OTHER THAN PSYCHIATRISTS 
The Ake opinion dealt exclusively with the indigent's right to a 
psychiatrist for the presentation of an insanity defense. 82 The Court 
did not address the question of whether the right to expert assistance 
might extend to other kinds of experts. Analysis of the opinion and of 
the constitutional doctrines on which it rests shows, however, that 
Ake's logic extends to the provision of other kinds of expert assistance 
in appropriate cases. 83 
Because of Ake's failure to address the question of other experts, as 
well as its emphasis on the importance of psychiatry in criminal law 
today,84 an argument might be made for limiting Ake to its facts, i.e., 
to the right to a psychiatrist for an insanity defense. The opinion is 
grounded, however, in very broad concepts of constitutional require-
ments, which indicate that it should have more general application. 
The Court declared that "when a State brings its judicial power to 
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take 
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his 
defense."85 Citing the fourteenth amendment's "due process guaran-
tee of fundamental fairness,"86 the Court discussed its precedents in 
the area of indigent defendants' rights, 87 concluding that the state 
must provide the indigent defendant with "access to the raw materials 
integral to the building of an effective defense."88 
The Court's conclusion that a psychiatrist is, in appropriate cases, 
one of these essential "raw materials" was based on its use of the 
three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 89 There is no reason to be-
lieve that the Mathews test would turn out any differently for a 
pathologist or a handwriting expert than it did for a psychiatrist in 
Ake. 90 The "private interest" - the defendant's interest in her life or 
liberty - is equally compelling, regardless of the nature of her defense 
or the type of expert required. The state's interest, largely an eco-
nomic one, is hardly more heavily burdened by the requirement that it 
provide access to one competent ballistics expert or arson investigator, 
for example, than to the "one competent psychiatrist" required by 
82. As the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out in Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 448-49, 330 
S.E.2d 563, 566 (1985), Ake specifically required a psychiatrist in cases of an insanity defense; 
thus, "the guidelines of Ake would not be satisfied by providing the defense with access to an 
examination by a mental health expert other than a psychiatrist." 
83. On the meaning of "appropriate cases," see Part V infra. 
84. 470 U.S. at 79-83, 85. 
85. 470 U.S. at 76. 
86. 470 U.S. at 76. 
87. 470 U.S. at 76. 
88. 470 U.S. at 77. 
89. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
90. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text. 
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Ake. 91 The experience of the federal government under the Criminal 
Justice Act,92 and of various states that provide expert services, has 
shown that the costs involved are reasonable.93 The "third prong," 
"the probable value of the [expert] assistance sought, and the risk of 
error in the proceeding if such assistance is not o:ffered,"94 yields a 
similar result. It is difficult to imagine how, when a conviction may 
turn on an issue of fact that may be established or refuted by expert 
assistance, the value of such assistance and the risk of error from its 
denial could be less than in the case of a psychiatrist.95 
As noted by Ake's counsel, the states have "recognized the neces-
sity of expert services in the most meaningful manner - by providing 
for State payment of experts' fees when the experts are hired by the 
prosecution. " 96 Widespread prosecutorial use of many kinds of non-
psychiatric97 experts not only illustrates the importance of expert ser-
vices but is also one reason why the defense is so seriously 
91. 470 U.S. at 79. 
92. See text at notes 13-15 supra. 
93. In response to Oklahoma's argument in Ake that the cost of providing indigent defen-
dants with psychiatrists would be "staggering," Brief of Respondent at 47, counsel for Ake 
presented figures showing very modest annual costs for all expert services incurred by the federal 
government ($832,305 in Fiscal Year 1983) and a sample of states (e.g., $53,995 in Kansas; 
$230,943 in Colorado; $428,252 in New Jersey; $1,209,183 in New York; $18,292 in Vermont). 
Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 13. In light of these modest costs, it is difficult to argue seriously 
that the state's fiscal interest should weigh heavily in the Mathews balance. Even if the cost of 
providing expert services were greater, it is at least open to question whether this factor should 
weigh heavily against the individual's interest in her life or liberty. See note 41 supra. 
A different kind of cost issue is whether, in an individual case, the expected cost of the re-
quested expert services should affect their provision. This would be an issue particularly where 
the expense is unusually high. The best answer is probably that unusual expenses might legiti-
mately require a somewhat higher showing of necessity for expert services. Cf. United States v. 
Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (refusal of authorization 
for an investigator to go to Peru in connection with the defendant's arrest there for conspiracy to 
import cocaine did not violate the federal Criminal Justice Act, absent a strong showing as to 
necessity). 
94. 470 U.S. at 79. 
95. For an argument to the contrary, see Note, supra note 35, at 149-51. 
96. Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Ake (emphasis in original). 
97. Even in regard to psychiatrists, theAke opinion dealt only with access to a psychiatrist 
for presentation of an insanity defense or on the issue of future dangerousness in capital sentenc-
ing proceedings. It did not explicitly address the right to a psychiatrist on other issues, such as 
determination of competency to stand trial or establishment of mitigating factors in sentencing. 
There has been some post-Ake litigation on such questions. For example, in Kordenbrock v. 
Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky. 1985), it was held that Ake did not grant a capital 
defendant a "psychiatric fishing expedition" in a search for mitigating factors in sentencing; see 
also Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363-64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Whatever the merits of 
these particular cases, it is hard to believe that Ake, together with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978) (sentencer must be permitted to consider all aspects of defendant's character as mitigating 
factors), would not guarantee a defendant the right to such psychiatric assistance as could help 
him to establish mitigating circumstances. 
Two courts have dealt with requests for mental health experts on the issue of the defendant's 
competency to waive his Miranda rights. Compare In re Allen R., - N.H. -, 506 A.2d 329 
(1986) (expert granted), with State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1986) (expert 
denied). 
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handicapped without them. It is illusory to expect that an unassisted 
defense counsel could adequately represent his client when confronted 
with complex scientific evidence: 
When counsel is shown a pathology report, a post-mortem photograph 
and a drawer full of autopsy specimens and slides, unless he himself is 
trained in pathology, he will be unlikely to spot possible errors of inter-
pretation or description, the omission of relevant data and procedures, or 
indeed, the very significance - both medical and forensic - of what he 
is shown. Similar problems confront counsel in cases involving plant 
identification, handwriting, blood typology, identification of drugs or 
fingerprints.98 
Given the importance of nonpsychiatric experts99 to accurate fact-
finding, Ake's reasoning requires that they be made available to the 
indigent defendant as well as the prosecution. 100 
The right to expert assistance is also implicit in other opinions of 
the Court, such as Gilbert v. California. 101 In Gilbert, the Court held 
that the ability of the defense to present its own expert witnesses and 
to cross-examine prosecution experts at trial made it unnecessary for 
defense counsel to be present during "non-critical" stages of proceed-
ings such as the taking of handwriting samples. 102 Thus, a defendant 
who because of indigency was unable to present an expert witness or 
effectively cross-examine prosecution experts would also be denied the 
98. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 663. 
99. Even experts who would not be allowed to testify in court should be provided where they 
"reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their preparation." United States v. Pope, 
251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966) (interpreting the federal Criminal Justice Act) (emphasis in 
original). For example, polygraph tests may often be helpful even where not admissible, as in 
cases where the district attorney may be willing to drop prosecution if the defendant "passes" a 
polygraph test. See Oaks, supra note 15, at § 7.14[2]. The most frequently used type of non-
testifying expert is the general investigator. See note 103 infra. 
100. The American Bar Association's STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 5-1.4 (2d ed. 
1980) calls for provision of "investigatory, expert, and other services necessary to an adequate 
defense," without any limitation to specific types of experts such as psychiatrists. The commen-
tary to this standard puts psychiatrists and other experts on the same plane in noting that "[t]he 
quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the 
defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are 
available." Id. 
Similarly, the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), provides 
for "investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense." During the first 
two years after the Act's passage, the most frequently used services were investigators, psychia-
trists, interpreters, handwriting experts, and fact witnesses. In addition, the following services 
were provided: bacteriologist, chemist, coin expert, certified public accountant, electroencepha-
lographic test, fingerprint expert, gun expert, jewelry appraiser, key punch operator, electronic 
data processing machine operator, neurologist, neuropsychiatrist, neurosurgeon, opthalmologist, 
optometrist, pathologist, pharmacologist, physician, psychologist, psychoanalyst, probation of-
ficer, sound expert statistician, surveyor, used clothing expert. Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[1]. 
101. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
102. 388 U.S. at 267; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967), where in 
dicta the Court made the same comment concerning the lack of necessity of the presence of 
counsel during the analysis of the defendant's "fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, hair, and 
the like." 
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Court-prescribed means of protecting her interests during these "non-
critical" stages. 
Since theAke decision, its author has hinted strongly thatAke may 
require the appointment of investigators103 for indigent defendants. 
Dissenting in United States v. Bagley, 104 Justice Marshall noted that 
"the Court has not ... expressly required that the State provide to the 
defendant ... investigators who will assure that the defendant has an 
opportunity to discover every existing piece of helpful evidence. But 
cf. Ake v. Oklahoma .... "105 
In the lower courts, a number of pre-Ake decisions involving inves-
tigators, 106 pathologists,107 and handwriting experts108 had found a 
constitutional duty to provide expert assistance. Few post-Ake cases 
have yet arisen where the courts have directly addressed the question 
of Ake's applicability to other experts. Exceptional - and almost cer-
tainly wrong - is Ex parte Grayson, 109 where the Alabama Supreme 
Court rejected the petitioner's "novel contention" that under Ake he 
was entitled to a forensic pathologist: "[T]here is nothing contained in 
the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was 
addressing anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity de-
fense." 110 Generally, where defendants have attempted to use theAke 
103. Investigators are among the most frequently needed types of defense experts. In recog-
nition of this the federal Criminal Justice Act provides explicitly for "investigative" services. 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982). Despite some reluctance on the part of the federal courts to grant 
defense investigators, Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[3]; Decker, supra note 17, at 605-07, investi-
gators were the most frequently used category of experts during the first two years the Criminal 
Justice Act was in effect. Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[1]. The Ninth Circuit has held that the 
provision of investigative services is required by due process when necessary to the preparation of 
an effective defense. Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 936 (1975) (holding, however, that the showing of need had not been made). See also 13 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 655 (1977). 
An additional reason for the provision of investigators is that an attorney doing her own 
investigation could be placed in an untenable position if a witness she interviewed changed his 
story in court. The attorney would then be faced with the difficult prospect of taking the stand to 
impeach the witness. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 661 n.48; Comment, Assistance 
in Addition to Counsel, supra note 17, at 327 n.31; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.7 (1983) (incompatibility of roles of witness and advocate). 
104. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). Bagley dealt with prosecutorial failure to disclose information 
favorable to the defense. 
105. 105 S. Ct. at 3390 (emphasis added). In its only other post-Ake case where the issue has 
arisen, the Court declined to consider the defendant's argument that he should have been granted 
an investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, on the ground that he had failed to 
make a sufficient showing of need for them. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 n. l 
(1985). On the showing required for access to an expert, see Part V infra. 
106. E.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane); Mason v. 
Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975). 
107. E.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980). 
108. E.g., People v. Watson, 36 III. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966). 
109. 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985). 
110. 479 So. 2d at 82. Even in this case the issues were mixed in such a way that the question 
may not have been squarely presented. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in passing on 
the case well before theAke decision, had in fact recognized a constitutional right to nonpsychia-
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precedent to obtain the assistance of non psychiatric experts, the courts 
have rejected the requests on the basis of insufficient showing of need 
for the expert. 111 Thus, while Ake's reasoning strongly suggests that 
the constitutional right to expert assistance is not limited to psychia-
trists for an insanity defense, 112 this remains to be established when an 
appropriate case arises. 
III. EXPERTS IN NONCAPITAL CASES 
A second question concerns the offenses to which the requirement 
for provision of expert assistance should apply. The initial issue is 
whether Ake applies only to capital cases. If it is not so limited, as this 
Note argues, a further question is the extent to which it extends to 
relatively minor offenses. This Note suggests that the right to expert 
assistance should exist in all cases where there is a right to counsel. 
tric expert assistance in appropriate cases. It held, however, that Grayson had not established a 
need for the requested services. Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 71-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). 
Grayson had been granted the statutory limit of $500 for expert services, which was spent on a 
public opinion survey in support of a motion for change in venue. The Alabama Supreme Court 
rejected his contention that the $500 limit violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. 4 79 
So. 2d at 78-79. 
In another case dealing explicitly with Ake's applicability to nonpsychiatric experts, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that he should have 
been provided with an expert in bloodstain analysis. Distinguishing Ake, the court argued that 
- in contrast to sanity issues - the 
risk [of inaccurate resolution] in other areas of scientific evidence is not necessarily present 
because the scientific expert is often able to explain to the jury how a conclusion was 
reached, the defense counsel can attack that conclusion, and the jury can then decide 
whether the conclusion had a sound basis. 
Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). The court's apparent assumptions 
- that expert opinion in scientific fields other than psychiatry is less controversial, and that an 
unassisted defense counsel is competent to challenge such experts - are at least questionable. 
See text accompanying note 98 supra; notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text. Denial of a 
defense expert would seem to have been particularly inappropriate in this case, moreover, since 
the court was required to decide as a question of first impression whether the serological electro-
phoresis method of bloodstain analysis was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. See 719 P.2d at 
839-40. The Michigan Supreme Court - with the benefit of expert opinion on both sides of the 
issue - has subsequently held electrophoresis evidence inadmissible. People v. Young, 425 
Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986). 
111. See, e.g., Hold v. State, 485 So. 2d 801, 802-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (investigator); 
Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891, 904-05 (1986) (investigator and "interrogation 
expert"); Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985) 
(serologist); State v. Artis, 316 N.C. 507, 342 S.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1986) (jury selection expert); 
State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811, 814-16 (1986) (investigator, statistician, social 
psychologist); State v. Allen, 77 N.C. App. 142, 334 S.E.2d 410, 412-13 (1985) (investigator); 
• Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (bitemark expert); State v. Berry, 
76 Or. App. l, 707 P.2d 638, 640 (1985) (anthropologist); State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985) (ballistics expert). In other cases, courts have rejected expert 
requests based on Ake on the ground that the proposed testimony would be inadmissible. See 
State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112, 498 A.2d 330 (1985) (child psychologist to evaluate the credi-
bility of a child witness); State v. Teeters, No. C-840397, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1985) 
(expert on rape trauma syndrome). But cf. note 99 supra. 
112. See notes 82-100 supra and accompanying text. 
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A. Capital and Noncapital Cases 
The issue of whether Ake's holding applied only to capital offenses 
separated the Ake majority from the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions.113 While the majority did not explicitly address this question, 
nothing suggests that it intended to limit its holding to capital cases. 
To the contrary, the opinion speaks in broad terms of the recognition 
of the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, and it refers to the 
individual's compelling interest where her "life or liberty" is at 
stake. 114 Apart from the actual facts of the case, it is difficult to find 
anything in the opinion that would justify limiting its scope to capital 
cases. Moreover, where the constitutional violation requiring reversal 
occurs during the guilt rather than the sentencing phase of a trial, 115 
and where, as here, the Court reverses the conviction rather than 
merely vacating the death sentence, "there is no logical basis for dis-
tinguishing between capital and non-capital defendants."116 
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Burger's brief opinion concurring in the 
judgment asserted that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion reaches non-
capital cases."117 Arguing that the "finality" of the sentence war-
ranted additional protection in capital cases, the Chief Justice wished 
to leave open the question of whether the assistance of a psychiatrist 
would be required in other cases. 118 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist 
urged that any right to psychiatric assistance be limited to capital 
cases. Unlike the Chief Justice, however, Rehnquist was well aware 
that the Court's opinion contained no such limitation.119 
113. As long as the issue is exclusively whether a psychiatrist, as opposed to other kinds of 
experts, is required, the question of whether Ake should extend to noncapital cases may rarely 
arise. Because a plea of insanity is "tantamount to an admission" of commission of the act, and 
because a successful insanity defense usually results in indeterminate confinement, "[i]nsanity 
pleas are almost exclusively raised in cases of homicide or other capital offenses." Gardner, The 
Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 99, 104 (1976). Thus, the 
real significance of applying Ake to noncapital offenses is seen only when it is also applied to 
experts other than psychiatrists. See Part II supra. 
114. 470 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). The brief on behalf of Ake in the Supreme Court 
seems consciously to avoid placing any emphasis on the fact that this was a capital case (except 
in its section concerning the sentencing proceedings). Brief for the Petitioner at 18-37. Appar-
ently the American Civil Liberties Union, which represented Ake in the Supreme Court, wished 
to establish a more broadly applicable precedent. 
115. In Ake, of course, the defendant's rights were violated during both the guilt phase, 470 
U.S. at 78-83, and the sentencing phase, 470 U.S. at 83-84. 
116. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1550 n.14 (1985). 
117. 470 U.S. at 87. At least two courts have indicated uncertainty, in view of the Chief 
Justice's opinion, as to whether Ake applied to noncapital cases. See Williams v. Newsome, 254 
Ga. 714, 715, 334 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1985); Satterwhite v. State, 697 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1985); see also State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985) 
(distinguishing Ake as a capital case). And one court has held flatly "that Ake does not reach 
noncapital cases." Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). 
118. 470 U.S. at 87. 
119. 470 U.S. at 87. 
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An examination of the Court's entire line of indigents' rights cases, 
of which Ake v. Oklahoma is the latest, also demonstrates that a dis-
tinction between capital and noncapital offenses has no place here. Of 
the eight cases cited in Ake 120 to illustrate the Court's "long 
recogni[tion] that when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an 
indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to as-
sure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his de-
fense," 121 only one was a capital case. 122 Important noncapital cases 
recognizing the rights of indigent defendants have been based on the 
sixth amendment right to counsel, 123 the fourteenth amendment equal 
protection guarantee, 124 and the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause.125 
The same considerations apply here as in the earlier debate on 
whether the right to counsel should extend to noncapital crimes. One 
commentator argued then that "the crucial inquiry would seem to be, 
not so much the penalties imposed on the defendant upon conviction, 
but the need for skilled representation in the proceedings," concluding 
that there was little reason to believe that this need was greater in 
capital than noncapital cases.126 Or, as Justice Clark noted in his con-
curring opinion in Gideon, "The Fourteenth Amendment requires due 
process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life,' 
and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the 
process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction in-
volved."127 In light of these precedents it is difficult to see how a right, 
determined by the Court to be essential to the due process guarantee of 
a fair trial, could be limited to capital cases.12s 
120. See 470 U.S. at 76. 
121. 470 U.S. at 76. 
122. Only Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), involved imposition of the death 
penalty. For the other, noncapital, cases cited by the Court, see note 39 supra. 
123. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial). 
124. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed counsel on first direct 
appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a trial transcript for appeal). 
125. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (right to appointed counsel under certain cir-
cumstances in parole and probation revocation proceedings). Even under the pre-Gideo11 right· 
to-counsel test of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), where the appointment of counsel was 
required only when "special circumstances" were present, imposition of capital punishment was 
only one of several possible circumstances in which due process required the appointment of 
counsel. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 11.l(a). 
126. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, a11d State Systems of Crimi11a/ Justice, 8 
DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 230-31 (1959) (emphasis in original); see also Kamisar, Betts v. Brady 
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 254-
60 (1962). 
127. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring). But cf. Com-
ment, The Constitutional Right to Assistance i11 Addition to Counsel i11 a Death Pe11alty Case, 23 
DuQ. L. REV. 753 (1985) (assuming that capital cases are qualitatively different). 
128. It is also worth observing that the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(e) (1982), which provides for the appointment of experts, contains no limitation to capi-
tal cases. In United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985), the court applied Ake to a 
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B. Ake's Lower Limit 
There remains the question of the "lower limit" of the constitu-
tional right to an expert. Because the right to counsel may be ineffec-
tive where necessary expert assistance is denied, 129 an indigent 
defendant should be granted the assistance of necessary experts in all 
cases where he has the constitutional right to counsel. 130 In 
Argersinger v. Hamlin 131 the Court extended this right to misde-
meanor cases where actual imprisonment is imposed; in Scott v. Illi-
nois 132 it refused to go beyond this to an "authorized imprisonment" 
standard which would require the appointment of counsel for offenses 
for which imprisonment could be imposed.133 As long as the line 
drawn by Argersinger and Scott defines the indigent defendant's right 
to counsel, it should also mark the lower limit of his right to expert 
assistance. 134 
IV. ROLE OF THE EXPERT 
One of the most difficult questions in the area of expert assistance 
noncapital case to reverse the trial court's determination that no defense psychiatrist was re-
quired under section 3006A. 
129. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. Even if it could be argued that the Ma-
thews due process balancing test might yield a different result where "only brief incarceration" 
was involved, see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 29, at 136 n.34, the indigent's right 
to an expert would still find support in the sixth amendment. 
130. The federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982), follows this ap-
proach. Subsection (a)(4) provides that the Act, which requires the appointment of both counsel 
and expert services, applies to any person "for whom the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
requires the appointment of counsel." The federal scheme for the appointment of counsel and 
expert assistance goes beyond the constitutional requirement, however, notably by mandating the 
appointment of counsel and experts in the case of any offense for which a sentence of over six 
months' imprisonment could be imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(l) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) 
(defining "petty offense"); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 §§ 212, 223(e), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3559, 
3006A(a)(l), (b) (1985), as amended by Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-217, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (replacing the concept of"petty offense," effective November 1, 
1987, by "Class B" misdemeanors or less). 
131. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
132. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
133. Scott has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and 
the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71 (1979); 
Elson, supra note 41, at 183-86. As it is difficult to argue that the right to expert assistance is 
more fundamental than the right to counsel, it is not contended here that the reach of Ake should 
extend beyond the right to appointed counsel, currently defined by Scott. But cf note 134 infra. 
134. Ake may also provide some basis for the application of a right to expert assistance in 
"quasi-criminal" civil proceedings. The Court noted that it had extended the rights of indigents 
"to a 'quasi-criminal' proceeding" in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), where in a paternity 
action the state was required to provide blood grouping tests for the putative father. Ake, 470 
U.S. at 76. Streater was thus a recognition of a right under certain circumstances to expert 
assistance in a "quasi-criminal" case, well before Ake established this right in criminal cases as 
such. Arguably, the Streater and Ake decisions could lead to a more general right to expert 
assistance in certain kinds of civil proceedings, for example civil commitment hearings. But see 
In re Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1985) (holding, in a civil commit-
ment hearing, that the right recognized in Ake "has not been extended to civil cases"). 
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is the definition of the expert's proper role. One model is that of the 
"neutral" expert, who makes her services and findings available to de-
fense and prosecution alike. Alternatively, one can imagine a "parti-
san" expert or "defense consultant,"135 who exclusively assists the 
defense in the same manner as would a retained expert. This Note 
argues that, in all respects except the defendant's free choice of his 
expert, a "partisan" expert is constitutionally required.136 
A starting point for analysis is the Ake opinion itself. Justice Mar-
shall's crucial language provides that once the necessary showing is 
made, 137 "the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access 
to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examina-
tion and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the de-
fense. " 138 The expert's proper role is, in other words, that of a 
consultant for the defense. The Court's clear statement is, however, 
somewhat qualified by what follows: "This is not to say, of course, 
that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psy-
chiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own." 
Rather, "as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the 
States the decision on how to implement this right."139 This qualifica-
tion introduces sufficient ambiguity and "flexibility" to ensure consid-
erable future litigation.140 
An examination of the Ake Court's handling of its 1953 precedent, 
United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 141 makes clear its position regard-
ing the expert's role. The Court first distinguished Baldi, where "neu-
tral psychiatrists" had in fact examined the defendant and testified at 
his trial. 142 Baldi thus did not address the Ake situation, where the 
defendant had been denied any psychiatric assistance concerning his 
sanity at the time of the offense; at most, the Court said, it stood for 
the proposition that an indigent defendant had a right only to the 
135. The term "defense consultant" is from Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Ake, 
470 U.S. at 87. 
136. The inquiry here is into the minimum treatment which a state must provide in order to 
satisfy the constitutional requirement. A state could, of course, exceed the minimum standard 
(for example by permitting the defendant to choose his own expert), but it could not constitution· 
ally deviate in the direction of a "neutral" expert. 
137. See Part V infra. 
138. 470 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). At another point, Marshall states the tasks of the 
psychiatrist as follows: "to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, 
to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in 
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses." 470 U.S. at 82. 
139. 470 U.S. at 83. • 
140. Indeed, one post-Ake writer has predicted that this issue will be the subject of the next 
constitutional battles. Sallet, supra note 116, at 1551 n.18. 
141. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra. Until Ake, most courts which rejected the con· 
stitutional right to expert assistance relied on Baldi. 
142. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84-85. The same was true, the Court noted, in McGarty v. O'Brien, 
188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir. 1951), on which the Baldi Court had relied. 470 U.S. at 85. 
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"neutral" assistance which the defendant in Baldi had received. 143 
The assistance of a "neutral" expert is thus the Baldi standard. This 
standard the Court proceeded to reject, declaring that "our disagree-
ment with the State's reliance on [Baldi] is more fundamental. That 
case was decided at a time when indigent defendants in state courts 
had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel." Since 
then, the Court had recognized the elementary rights of indigent de-
fendants and thus signaled its "commitment to assuring meaningful 
access to the judicial process." Thus, "we are not limited by [Baldi] in 
considering whether fundamental fairness today requires a different 
result." 144 
It is clear therefore from the Ake opinion that while the indigent 
defendant does not have the constitutional right to choose his own 
expert, and while the states are left some flexibility in implementation 
of arrangements for expert services, the expert is not to be "neutral"; 
rather, she is to assist the defense. Her role is to include the functions 
of investigation, evaluation of strategies, preparation and presentation 
of testimony, and preparation of cross-examination of prosecution 
experts. 145 
In spite of this relatively clear language in Ake, the issue appears 
not to be fully settled in practice. A number of post-Ake cases in the 
lower courts have accepted arrangements where only "neutral" ex-
perts - or less - were provided.146 It is thus important to under-
143. 470 U.S. at 85. 
144. 470 U.S. at 85. 
145. By establishing the indigent defendant's right to a defense expert, Ake seems to have 
expanded the rights of nonindigents as well. This is apparent in Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 
Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2315, affd. on remand, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 
838 (1985). Following a court-ordered sanity evaluation at a state hospital, the court denied 
defendant's request for a second examination at his own expense. 323 S.E.2d at 544. The 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded "in light of Ake v. Oklahoma." 105 S. Ct. 
2315. On remand the Virginia Supreme Court held that Tuggle's rights had been violated by 
denial of a defense psychiatrist in the sentencing phase of trial; in regard to the guilt phase it held 
that the defendant had not made the requisite showing that sanity was to be a siguificant factor in 
his defense, but it made no reference to defendant's nonindigent status. 334 S.E.2d at 841-44. 
Thus, the actions of both the United States and Virginia Supreme Courts indicate that they see 
the Ake right to a defense psychiatrist as extending to nonindigent defendants. Similarly, Ake's 
emphasis on the right to an independent defense expert should result in reexamination of rules 
which limit independent analysis of physical evidence to evidence which is "critical" (i.e., the 
only evidence linking the defendant to the crime) and subject to varying expert opinions. See 
Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1979); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 
1975); Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985). 
146. See, e.g., Glass v. Blackbum, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussed at note 
150 infra and accompanying text); Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(discussed at note 175 infra); Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985) (discussed at 
note 151 infra and accompanying text); Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. 
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985) (discussed at note 152 infra and accompanying text); State v. 
lndvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (N.D. 1986) (discussed at note 150 infra and accompanying 
text); Satterwhite v. State, 697 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (discussed in text at note 
150 infra); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (1985) (discussed in 
text at note 150 infra). But see, e.g., Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 449, 330 S.E.2d 563, 567 
1348 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1326 
stand why a "partisan" expert is essential to due process. 147 
There are several reasons why an "impartial" or "neutral" expert 
is not an adequate safeguard of the defendant's constitutional rights. 148 
The problem is particularly severe, first of all, under a scheme where 
the "neutral" expert's findings are available to both the defense and 
the prosecution. It is difficult, in such a situation, to imagine a defense 
attorney, unless his case was already a very weak one, requesting the 
appointment of such an expert without being certain of a favorable 
result. Otherwise, he would risk creating evidence against his client 
and "convicting [his] own client with [his] diligence and zeal."149 Sev-
eral post-Ake cases have, to be sure, condoned procedures under 
which the expert reported his findings to the court150 or to the prose-
(1985) ("[I]n addition to examining the defendant, the psychiatrist must assist the defense by 
aiding defense counsel in the cross-examination and rebuttal of the state's medical experts."). 
147. In addition, the analysis presented below is important for purposes of dealing with 
problems which are likely to arise from the Court's willingness to leave implementation to the 
states. See notes 183-89 infra and accompanying text. 
148. For an argument to the contrary, see Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17, 
at 499-504. 
149. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 666. Even where the test results are not dis-
closed, the mere knowledge that an examination took place may be prejudicial. See, e.g., Hill v. 
State, 432 So. 2d 427, 437 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), where the court cited as 
evidence of the defendant's competence his failure to offer the testimony of a psychologist who 
had examined him prior to trial. 
At least one court has suggested that procedures where the "neutral" expert makes his find-
ings available to ,the prosecution and the defense might raise constitutional problems of self· 
incrimination. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1955) (questioning 
constitutionality of former FED. R. CRIM. P. 28, predecessor of FED. R. Evm. 706(a), which 
required court-appointed expert to disclose findings to both parties), revd. on other grounds, 241 
F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957); see also Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.16[3]. In Smith v. Murray, 106 S. 
Ct. 2661 (1986), the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to rule on the admissibility of dam-
aging testimony by a psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine the defendant at the latter's 
request, deciding the case instead on procedural grounds. Four Justices, however, were willing 
to reach the merits and would have held that, at a minimum, admitting the examining psychia-
trist's testimony would violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, unless the psychiatrist gave Miranda warnings prior to the examination. 106 S. Ct. at 2675-
76 & n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters found it unnecessary to consider the argument 
that where the psychiatric examination was ordered to assist the defense the due process con-
cerns of Ake required "an absolute guarantee of confidentiality," rather than merely the giving of 
Miranda warnings. 106 S. Ct. at 2676 n.23. 
The reports of a defense expert are generally discoverable by the prosecution only when the 
defense intends to introduce the reports or the expert's testimony at trial. Otherwise discovery 
would be barred by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the sixth amend· 
ment right to effective assistance of counsel. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at 
§ 19.4(i). The concerns here are similar to those which have led most states to apply the 
attorney-client privilege to the work of defense experts. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 
520, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979) ("[I]t is now almost universally accepted in this country that the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege, at least in criminal causes, embraces those agents whose 
services are required by the attorney in order that he may properly prepare his client's case."). 
But cf Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists. 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 
635-42 (1980) (urging that the attorney-client privilege not be used to exclude psychiatric testi-
mony when the defendant's mental state is at issue). 
150. Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (two-doctor "sanity com-
mission" reporting to the court); State v. lndvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (N.D. 1986) (state 
hospital staff psychiatrists, who ultimately testified for the prosecution); Satterwhite v. State, 697 
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cution for transmittal to the defense, 151 or where the defense was sim-
ply given access to the findings of the state's experts.152 A better 
reading of Ake, however, is that of the Tenth Circuit, which empha-
sized in United States v. Sloan 153 that the Court's duty to appoint a 
defense expert "cannot be satisfied with the appointment of an expert 
who ultimately testifies contrary to the defense . . . . The essential 
benefit of having an expert in the first place is denied the defendant 
when the services of the doctor must be shared with the 
prosecution." 154 
More fundamentally, the use of an "impartial" expert subverts the 
adversary system by shifting the decision from the jury (or judge) to 
the expert. Expert opinion is, in fact, often unreliable, 155 and use of an 
"impartial" expert gives a false illusion of certainty; a "battle of the 
experts" in the context of the adversary system, on the other hand, 
permits the jury to evaluate scientific opinions. Thus, due process may 
be denied where the indigent defendant is not granted the resources to 
participate independently in this "battle of the experts."156 
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 
840-41 (1985). 
151. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985). The court did hold that in order 
to comply with Ake the psychiatrist would have to be "available for consultation with [defense] 
counsel"; it added, however, that such consultations could not take place before the psychiatrist 
examined the defendant. 486 N.E.2d at 482. The court's model is still that of a "neutral" expert, 
with some concession to the defense counsel's need to prepare for trial. It is doubtful, to say the 
least, that such an arrangement satisfies the requirements of Ake. The most obvious objection is 
that the defense counsel must surely be permitted to form an opinion about the viability of an 
insanity defense (to use this example) without creating evidence which can be used against his 
client. 
152. Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985) 
("[A]ppellee herein was not denied the results and reports of the serologist who did testify, and 
should have had some idea of the nature of his testimony prior to trial."). The court disposed of 
Ake by asserting that the Supreme Court's mention in a footnote of relevant Kentucky statutes 
meant "that Kentucky ... provides the necessary assistance." Cf. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78 n.4 (listing 
statutes and judicial decisions in 41 states which provide psychiatric assistance to indigent de-
fendants). 
If defense access to findings of the prosecution experts is deemed adequate, why not the 
reverse? Simply to mention the possibility that the prosecution could be precluded from utilizing 
government funds for its own expert because a defense expert's report was available should suf-
fice to demonstrate the incompatibility with an adversary proceeding of such one-sided arrange-
ments. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 658. 
153. 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985). 
154. 776 F.2d at 929. An example of a state's recognition of the partisan nature of the de-
fense expert and the confidential nature of her relationship with defense counsel is to be found in 
Florida's Rules of Criminal Procedure. These provide that in appropriate cases where insanity 
or incompetence is at issue, the court "shall appoint one expert to examine the defendant in order 
to assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense. Such expert shall report only to the 
attorney for the defendant and matters related to the expert shall be deemed to fall under the 
lawyer-client privilege." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(a). 
155. See notes 162-70 infra and accompanying text. 
156. The question raised here has potentially broader significance than the application to 
indigent defendants. Although rarely used, FED. R. Evm. 706 permits the court to appoint its 
own independent expert, who "shall advise the parties of his findings." For a discussion of some 
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It is important to note that the question is not whether an impar-
tial expert could provide due process in any setting, but rather 
whether such an arrangement provides due process for the indigent 
defendant in the American criminal justice system based on adversary 
proceedings. What may be fair in some nonadversarial settings may 
be a denial of justice in the context of the adversary system. 157 As the 
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he very premise of our adversary system 
of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will 
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and 
the innocent go free." 158 And if the criminal justice process "loses its 
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional 
guarantee [of the effective assistance of counsel] is violated."159 
Considerable empirical evidence on the use of court-appointed 
"impartial" experts, and particularly psychiatrists, has shown that the 
trier of fact, whether judge or jury, almost invariably accepts the ex-
pert's opinion.160 Thus, the decisionmaking function shifts from the 
jury or judge to the expert, undermining the adversary system. 161 
of the problems involved in judges calling their own expert witnesses, see Saltzburg, The Unnec-
essarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 74-80 (1978). 
157. Cf Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (For "incorporation" of specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, the question is not whether the 
provision constitutes "fundamental fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but 
[whether it] is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American 
States."). 
158. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). 
159. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984). 
160. An examination of the use of court-appointed experts, based on research in Sweden and 
on various American studies, concluded that "the presentation of psychiatric opinions to a judge 
or jury by court-appointed psychiatrists designated 'impartial,' rather than by psychiatrists called 
by and identified with the state or defense as adversaries, shifts the decision-making power from 
the judge or jury to the testifying psychiatrists." Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity 
Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish 
Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 770 (1974). In the Swedish study, the courts followed the 
psychiatrists' recommendations in 99% of the cases. Id. Similarly, a study of the results of jury 
trials in states providing for court appointment of a state mental institution showed that, over 
periods of 23 and 30 years, juries rejected the hospitals' conclusions in only five of 1000 cases in 
Ohio, and only once in 500 cases in Maine. Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist on the 
Witness Stand, 32 B.U. L. REv. 287, 313-14 (1952). A former practicing psychiatrist at St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia noted from his experience that "[i]n the over-
whelming majority of cases the hospital's report to the court is the sole determinant of the out-
come of the insanity defense." Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing 
Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1913 WASH. U. L.Q. 87, 89. The trial becomes merely 
"a nonadversary process of rubber stamping the conclusions of psychiatrists regarding the de-
fendant's responsibility." Gardner, supra note 113, at 106. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
35, at 131-36; Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 
110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1067-76 (1962). 
161. The undermining of the adversary system may also have broader consequences for the 
system of justice and the community within which it exists. As noted by the Attorney General's 
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, the adversary system 
evolved out of "a system of justice that provide[d] inadequate opportunities to challenge official 
decisions • . . . As such, it makes essential and invaluable contributions to the maintenance of the 
free society." Thus, "the conditions produced by the financial incapacity of the accused are 
detrimental to the proper functioning of the system of justice and •.• the loss in vitality of the 
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Moreover, the appearance of certainty presented by the testimony of a 
court-appointed "impartial" expert is often an illusion. While particu-
larly clear in the case of psychiatric testimony,162 evidence of the unre-
liability or misuse of expert opinions exists in fields such as laboratory 
testing, 163 handwriting, 164 pathology, 165 fingerprinting, 166 arson inves-
adversary system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests of a free com-
munity." POVERTY AND THE ADMINISfRATION OF JusncE, supra note 3, at 10-11. 
162. Reisner and Semmel note that the argument for "impartial" psychiatric experts rests on 
three premises: "first, that the diagnostic and predictive process is scientific, that is, having some 
unified theoretical framework capable of producing an acceptable level of reliability; second, that 
a state-operated psychiatric service is 'impartial;' third, that the issue to be determined is purely a 
scientific one." Reisner & Semmel, supra note 160, at 772 (footnotes omitted). In fact, they find 
that "[f]ew scientific disciplines contain such a range of theories as clinical psychology and psy-
chiatry," id.: that diagnosis is highly subjective, depending on factors such as the examiner's 
personality, age, nationality, peer group influence, and theoretical orientation, id. at 773; that 
there is little agreement on diagnostic categories, resulting in a lack of diagnostic reliability, id. at 
774-76; that court-appointed psychiatrists tend to come from a self-selected group with an orien-
tation toward narrow interpretation of legal criteria, id. at 782; that psychiatrists from state 
hospitals may reflect an institutional bias stemming from the high degree of debilitation of those 
they can normally admit, id.; and that in the American tradition the determination of sanity in a 
criminal trial reflects societal concerns beyond purely medical expertise. Id. at 783-84. The liter-
ature in which similar arguments are advanced is voluminous. See, e.g., T. BLAU, THE PSY-
CHOLOGIST AS EXPERT WITNESS 93 (1984) (in most cases opinions likely to be equivocal and 
varied); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 133-34 (psychiatric testimony subject to distortion and 
differences reflecting differing values and schools); A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND 
THE CRIMINAL LA w 40-43 (1970) (prosecution orientation and institutional bias of "impartial" 
experts); 1 J. ZISKIN, CoPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsnMONY (3d ed. 
1981); Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS 
221 (1959); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 
(1974) (inability of psychiatrists to predict future dangerousness); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry 
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 
(1974) (psychiatric judgments in civil commitment cases are unreliable and invalid); Gardner, 
supra note 113, at 107 (Impartial experts "are neither the impartial dispensers of scientific verity 
they are assumed to be nor do they possess any unique expertise in matters involving criminal 
responsibility."); Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1072-74 (no consensus among psychiatrists 
on answers to questions likely to arise in court, or on psychiatric qualifications and techniques); 
Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 559, 580-81 (1972) (cursory nature of psychiatric evaluations in public mental 
hospital); Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
201, 202-09 (1977); Pugh, supra note 160, at 93-105 (lack of reliability and validity in sanity 
tests); id. at 95 ("A common experience was that a new doctor on the service would find virtually 
every defendant insane. . . . However, after being confronted with the task of trying to manage 
an unselected group of felons in the hospital following their criminal commitment, the new doc-
tor would reverse tack and become very stringent about finding defendants insane."). 
163. A national evaluation of the accuracy of tests done in 240 forensic laboratories, funded 
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, produced the following results: 
The laboratories mis-identified or had an otherwise unacceptable response in 18% of the 
cases involving the identification of an unknown controlled substance. Twenty-eight percent 
could not perform proper ballistics tests, 20% failed to identify paint samples, and 71 % 
could not identify blood samples. In fact, only 49 of 240 participating laboratories received 
a grade of "100%." It should be noted that this 100% figure was arrived at only by deleting 
the results of two of the twenty-one tests (those for hair and firearms). Evidently, none of 
the 240 laboratories was able to identify all of the samples - and only one-fifth were able to 
identify most of them. 
Kurzman, Challenging "Scientific Evidence": Using the Results of the Laboratory Proficiency 
Testing Research Program, in REsULTS OF THE LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TEsnNG RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM xii (National College for Criminal Defense 1979) (emphasis in original) [here-
inafter cited as PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM]. The authors of the LEAA research report 
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concluded, moreover, that such poor results "could be expected. All of the previous reports 
which have addressed the issue have inferred the likelihood of such a finding." PROFICIENCY 
TESTING PROGRAM, supra, at 261. 
One defense lawyer with a scientific background has made the following observation regard-
ing the generally low quality of testimony by laboratory experts: 
The expert has only the vaguest understanding of the principles of the scientific disci· 
pline in which he testifies; he has no knowledge of the mathematics which expresses these 
principles and relates the significant variables. He knows little more about the operation of 
his measuring instruments than the location of the on-off switch. He knows virtually noth· 
ing about the interpretation of the results of his tests and less about statistical techniques for 
assessing the validity of his conclusions. 
Shellow, The Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program: What it Means, in PROFICIENCY TESTING 
PROGRAM, supra, at iii. This state of affairs suggests not only the possibility of errors, but also 
the potential for impeachment of prosecution experts, if defense counsel has been able to prepare 
a cross-examination with the assistance of her own expert. 
Laboratories may also be subject to subtle pressures which might result in bias. One study of 
the functioning of crime laboratories notes that "[a]s a part of the total police function, the 
laboratory is expected to justify the resources budgeted for its scientific services. This pressure 
has led, in some instances, to record keeping which stresses convictions, clearances, or positive 
findings .... " J. PETERSON, THE UTILIZATION OF CRIMINALISTICS SERVICES BY THE POLICE 
5 (1974). 
164. While disagreement on handwriting identification is relatively rare among competent 
document examiners, the field is full of "persons holding themselves out as experts ••• whose 
qualifications are subject to serious attack." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
IN CRIMINAL CASES 477 (2d ed. 1978). In addition, disagreements among fully qualified experts 
do occur, as in the 1972 Howard Hughes autobiography hoax. Id. at 478; cf. State v. Hancock, 
164 N.W.2d 330, 332-33 (Iowa 1969) (court granted forgery defendant her own handwriting 
expert because of recognition of variations in handwriting analyses). 
165. Where, as in many states, analysis of causes of death is performed by the local coroner's 
office, the reliability of the results is often questionable: 
It has been suggested that the coroner may be visualized as a poorly paid, undertrained and 
unskilled individual, popularly elected to a somewhat obscure office for a short term, with a 
staff of mediocre ability. Since it is frequently difficult for the trained forensic pathologist to 
distinguish the cause of death, that task is obviously much more difficult when the physician 
is not a trained forensic pathologist, or perhaps not even a pathologist. 
In rural communities, local physicians and surgeons who are available to the coroner to 
perform autopsies may lack the necessary experience and training in pathology to make 
meaningful diagnoses. If a capable pathologist from another jurisdiction is not called in to 
do the autopsy, serious errors in postmortem diagnosis are likely. When matters proceed to 
criminal trial, an untrained physician who is offered as an expert to prove cause and effect 
issues may be effectively impeached by a well prepared cross-examiner. 
A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 221. A related problem is the tendency of many 
courts to permit nonspecialized physicians to testify as experts on cause of death issues. Id. at 
260, 267-68. 
For examples of expert disagreement, see California v. Gutierrez, No. 84415 (Cal. Super. Ct., 
San Francisco Cty., Nov. 11, 1972), and People v. Barry, No. 136128 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo 
Cty., Sept. 11, 1968), unreported California cases discussed in Margolin & Wagner, supra note 
17, at 657 n.35, 658. In Gutierrez, 
the coroner testified "with 95% conviction" from a postsuture photograph of the wound 
and without reference to any other facts, that the wound could not have been self-inflicted 
but had to be assaultive. He based this opinion on the absence of "hesitation marks" typical 
of suicidal wounds, and the curving angle of the wound. The defense pathologist, equally 
adamant in his opinion, testified that hesitation marks under the ear probably were obliter-
ated in surgery; that a post-operative photograph was an unreliable source of information on 
the subject; that the breaks in the line of the wound indicated hesitation marks anyway; that 
the turn of the head, the shallowness of the wound [and various nonpathological factors] all 
suggested a suicidal act. 
Id. at 657 n.35. In Barry, two qualified pathologists disagreed over whether a slide showed tissue 
depleted of blood or satiated with blood. Id. at 658. 
166. While there are seldom direct conflicts in interpretation of fingerprint evidence, such 
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tigation, 167 alcohol intoxication testing, 168 bitemark identification, 169 
and voice identification. 110 
The adversary system and the much-maligned "battle of the ex-
perts" recognize that the expert, like any other witness, is fallible, 171 
and that the truth is most likely to emerge through each side present-
ing its own case. The use of an "impartial" expert, on the other hand, 
ensures that the indigent defendant has no real chance to challenge the 
expert's testimony. If the "neutral" expert testifies adversely to the 
defendant's position, "the accused will have no resources available to 
make the kind of corrections the adversary process assumes he is able 
to make .... [Cross-examination without the assistance of an expert] 
will hardly suffice to provide the indigent accused with the 'adequate 
evidence may still be subject to error: "[I]n a great number of criminal cases an expert or con-
sultant on fingerprints for the defense has been instrumental in seriously undermining the state's 
case by demonstrating faulty procedures used by the state's witnesses or by simply showing 
human errors in the use of fingerprint evidence." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 
368. And, while infrequent, differing interpretations of fingerprint evidence do arise. See United 
States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing conviction because of failure to 
provide defense fingerprint expert under the federal Criminal Justice Act); A. MOENSSENS & F. 
INBAU, supra note 164, at 392 (circumstances which may lead to disagreement in identification); 
Note, Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense, supra note 17, at 638 n.38 (reporting case of 
expert disagreement, resulting in acquittal). 
167. See the contradictory conclusions of two arson investigations in a case discussed in M. 
SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LmGATION 36-37 (1983). 
168. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 84-86 (sources of error in blood, urine, 
and breath tests). 
169. According to Moenssens and Inbau, bitemark examinations are helpful primarily as 
investigative leads. Only rarely can they provide a positive identification of a particular individ-
ual. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 650-52, 656-58. In spite of their controver-
sial status among professionals in forensic odontology, bitemark examinations appear to be 
generally accepted by the courts. See Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761, 763 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1985); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 845 (1985); A. MOENSSENS & F. 
INBAU, supra note 164, at 654-56. 
170. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 580-84 (criticizing the professional 
certification association for spectrographic voice identification as lacking scientific detachment 
and dominated by individuals whose careers are dependant on the success of spectrographic 
techniques). The courts are divided on the admissibility of spectrographic voice identifications. 
Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 
(1979), with People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), and People 
v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977). See generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, 
supra note 164, at 564-86. 
171. Cf. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 657: 
[P]erhaps "the battles of the experts" are neither unnecessary nor improper. The very fact 
that experts do disagree demonstrates that an expert should not be presumed infallible 
merely because he is selected by the court. In fact, experts, from psychiatrists and patholo-
gists to professors of criminalistics, remain quite human behind the facade of their superior 
qualifications and much in their testimony goes not to abstract factual findings but to find-
ings anchored in their philosophical predispositions, rooted in their unconscious tendencies 
and sprouting a veritable forest of personal mannerisms. 
Similarly, Reisner and Semmel, noting the Jack of consistency in psychiatric diagnoses, conclude 
that "[t]raditional adversary procedures are the best for exposing differences in professional judg-
ments. The oft-decried 'battle of the experts' is, in fact, particularly appropriate where the ex-
perts so often disagree." Reisner & Semmel, supra note 160, at 787. 
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defense' which only his own expert can assure."172 Particularly be-
cause of the "mystic infallibility" which lay juries often accord the 
testimony of scientific experts, "the ability to produce rebuttal experts, 
equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular 
technique, may prove to be essential."173 
In addition to the problem of shifting the decision about the de-
fendant's fate from the jury to an expert, there are other reasons why it 
is essential for the indigent defendant to have her own "partisan" ex-
pert. One is the potential conflict of interest if, for example, the court 
appoints a state agency to undertake tests or carry out investigation 
requested by the defendant. If, in such a situation, the agency discov-
ered evidence incriminating to the defendant, it would be faced with 
an "inescapable conflict of interest" between its "duty to the accused 
and [its] duty to the public interest."174 
The notion that an "impartial" expert could suffice to guarantee 
the indigent defendant due process of law also overlooks the important 
functions performed by the expert in addition to testimony at trial. 
The Court outlined these in Ake: investigation of the facts, evaluation 
of the viability of a given defense, and, especially assistance in prepar-
ing cross-examination of the prosecution's experts.175 Moreover, the 
lawyer and the expert must work together closely enough to perform a 
mutual education function.176 
The preparation of cross-examination is probably the most crucial 
of these additional functions. 177 Without the assistance of an expert at 
this stage, defense counsel may well be unable to challenge even an 
172. Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1075-76. 
173. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
174. Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970). In Marshal/, the trial 
court responded to the defendant's request for investigative assistance in another city by ap-
pointing the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI, acting on information supplied by the 
defendant, located a witness who was ultimately subpoenaed by the prosecution and testified 
adversely to the defendant. The Tenth Circuit reversed. 
175. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833-34 (10th Cir. 
1986) (despite testimony of four treating or court-appointed psychiatrists, defendant was entitled 
to his own psychiatrist to aid in interpretation of experts' findings and in preparation of cross-
examination). These additional functions of the expert were ignored in Magwood v. Smith, 791 
F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1986), affg. 608 F. Supp. 218 (M.D. Ala. 1985). The Magwood court 
approved the denial of the defendant's motion for appointment of an independent expert, distin-
guishing Ake on the grounds that here three of the state's six experts had testified favorably to the 
defendant's position. The court overlooked the fact that presenting testimony is only one of 
several functions which Ake identified for the expert. In Magwood the defendant presumably had 
no expert assistance in, for example, preparation of cross-examination of the experts favorable to 
the state. In view of the closeness of the insanity issue in this case, see 791 F.2d at 1449-50; 608 
F. Supp. at 226-28, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that such assistance might have made n 
difference in the verdict. 
176. For a discussion of the relationship between lawyer and psychiatrist in preparing for 
trial, see Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1064-66. 
177. The Supreme Court has indicated the importance of defense experts to cross-examina-
tion in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
227-28 (1967); see notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text. 
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expert whose testimony rests on a shaky foundation. 178 As one trial 
handbook points out, cross-examination of an opposing expert can be 
effective only if the attorney has "become somewhat of an expert on 
the subject ... by preparation[,] study, and consultation with her own 
experts. " 179 
An additional consequence of the lack of a "partisan" expert is 
that it can be virtually impossible for the defendant to demonstrate to 
an appellate court the prejudice he has suffered from the denial of ex-
pert assistance. Without the means to challenge the findings of a 
"neutral" expert, defense counsel cannot build a record for review.180 
The result is that reviewing courts uphold the denial of a defense ex-
pert because the state's expert evidence was "unchallenged,"181 or be-
cause the record fails to show "any question about the validity or 
accuracy of the tests performed."182 
Even if it is established that a "partisan" expert is essential to the 
indigent defendant's assertion of his constitutional rights, there re-
mains the question of how this expert is to be selected. Here, Ake is 
likely to generate considerable confusion, for while the opinion makes 
clear that the expert must be a "defense consultant," it also denies the 
indigent defendant the right to choose his own expert and leaves to the 
states the implementation of the right to an expert.183 
178. See the comments of forensic experts, noted by M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra 
note 167, at 45, that "cross-examination often is irrelevant to what they consider to be the main 
issues." A deputy fire marshal interviewed in this study noted that had the defense attorney in 
the case studied known what questions to ask, "[he could have] tore up our butt." Id. at 39 
(brackets in original). 
179. 2 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE§ 14.23 (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis added). In 
the Ake trial, defense counsel examining the psychiatric experts missed an opportunity to estab-
lish the defendant's mental illness at the time of the crime, apparently because of lack of familiar-
ity with the criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia contained in the American Psychiatric 
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Reply Brief for the 
Petitioner at 4 & n.3, Ake. 
180. Similar arguments were made prior to Gideon in regard to the provision of counsel: 
What do you mean "establish that the defendant was not disadvantaged by the absence of 
counsel?" A record can "establish" no such thing. It can only fail to establish on its face 
that the defendant was disadvantaged. What does it prove that the record reads well? How 
would it have read if the defendant had had counsel? What defenses would have been raised 
then which are not suggested now? We don't know and we never will. 
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Perva-
sive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 53 (1962) (emphasis in original). 
181. State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985). In affirming the 
trial court's denial of an independent ballistics expert, the court distinguished Ake, inter alia, on 
the grounds that there no expert testimony had been offered on either side. "In the instant case, 
the State offered competent, reliable, and unchallenged expert evidence regarding the ballistics 
tests that were made." (Emphasis added.) One might wonder how the defendant could have 
meaningfully challenged the ballistics evidence, in light of the trial court's refusal to provide him 
with expert assistance. 
182. Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), affd. sub nom. Ex parte 
Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985) (upholding the trial court's 
denial of defense experts to analyze fingerprint, semen, blood, and hair evidence). 
183. 470 U.S. at 83. 
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In deciding to leave implementation to the states, the Court noted 
that this is the rule for the provision of counsel. Thus the states are 
free to arrange a public defender program, to appoint other counsel, or 
to permit the indigent to choose counsel at state expense. While this 
system works relatively well for counsel, it is more problematic when 
applied to scientific experts. Lawyers, whether retained, appointed, or 
employed by a public defender's office, operate under an ethical stan-
dard dictating partisanship in favor of the client. While the retained 
expert will presumably, within the limits dictated by her professional 
standards, do the maximum to help her client attain a favorable out-
come, there is no similar incentive for the expert appointed by the 
court without the participation of defense counsel. A court-appointed 
expert, while complying with the letter of Ake's requirements, could 
conceive of her role as essentially that of a disinterested factfinder, 
rather than one whose job is to help the defense to the extent compati-
ble with professional standards. Much more than in the case of coun-
sel, therefore, the courts must consider how the identity of the 
scientific expert's "employer" will affect her work.184 
This does not mean that the defendant has a constitutional right to 
"an expert who would agree to testify in accordance with his 
wishes."185 The argument is merely that the appointed expert must be 
"partisan" in the sense of assisting the defense in the same way as 
would a retained expert. In some cases, of course, this might mean 
advising counsel that a given defense is untenable - but in others it 
could mean discovering additional defenses, of which counsel was 
unaware. 
Clearly, the state is not required to finance a defendant's "shopping 
excursion for a favorable expert,"186 and Ake makes clear that the in-
digent defendant has no constitutional right to an absolute choice of 
his own expert.187 The solution, nonetheless, which would most read-
ily guarantee respect for the defendant's due process rights - and 
avoid considerable litigation over the "effective assistance" of the ex-
pert188 - would be to permit the defense at least a measure of partici-
184. The question is likely to become acute in a case where the appointed expert refuses to 
provide the kind of assistance to which the defense believes it is entitled under Ake. Salle!, supra 
note 116, at 1551 n.18. 
185. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 934 (11th Cir. 1985), modified, 781 F.2d 185 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
186. This phrase has, however, been frequently used by courts to deny the defendant his own 
expert where a prosecution expert has already testified on the issue. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 
618 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing district court holding that defendant's request for 
his own pathologist, where state pathologist had testified with "the highest degree of medical 
certainty,'' amounted to "shopping for a favorable expert witness"). 
187. 470 U.S. at 83. 
188. Cf., e.g., Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985) (rejecting appellant's 
claim that his court-appointed psychiatrists did not understand the insanity defense and ex-
amined him only cursorily). 
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pation in the choice of the expert. 189 This would move the indigent 
defendant's situation closer to that of the defendant of means, without 
significant additional cost, by helping to shape the role of the expert as 
"employed" by the defense and thus, within limits, responsible to it. 
V. THRESHOLD SHOWING FOR ACCESS TO EXPERT SERVICES 
A final problem, particularly acute when the Ake doctrine is ex-
tended to other kinds of experts, is that of determining when an expert 
is "necessary for an adequate defense." 190 In other words, at what 
threshold is an expert to be provided? What preliminary showing, if 
any, must an indigent defendant make in order to obtain the right to 
appointment of an expert? Ake sets out a "presumed need" formula, 
under which an expert should be granted whenever a relevant issue 
exists at trial. This test must be supplemented by the requirement that 
the defense be provided with at least the same type of expert assistance 
as is employed by the prosecution, as well as by ready access to a 
minimal level of preliminary assistance. 
As the Ake Court noted, an expert's assistance is not necessary in 
all cases.191 The Court thus limited its holding - in the context of the 
insanity defense - to cases where "a defendant demonstrates to the 
trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant 
factor at trial."192 A similar formula can be applied in many other 
contexts. 
The Ake formulation could be described as a "presumed need" 
standard, that is, one where the defendant's need for the expert is pre-
sumed once it is established that a certain issue will be a "significant 
factor" at trial. 193 Once the defendant has shown that the relevant 
189. The American Bar Association's recently adopted CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.3(a) (1984) calls for the states in appropriate cases to provide a 
mental health expert "selected by defendant." In this respect, the Ake opinion lags behind the 
ABA. It is possible to imagine various scenarios for defense participation in the choice of an 
expert, such as the defense choosing from a court-approved list, proposing one or more names for 
the court's approval, or having the right to reject one court nominee. Of course the simplest 
solution would be to permit the defendant to choose his expert, subject only to court control of 
the expert's qualifications and her fee. It is not argued, however, that this complete freedom of 
choice is necessarily mandated by the Constitution. But cf Tague, An Indigent's Right to the 
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974) (arguing that an indigent should have the 
same right as a nonindigent to select his own counsel). 
190. The language is that of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) 
(1982), quoted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. The statutory term "necessary" has been interpreted to 
mean "reasonably necessary." See, e.g., United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 
1976); United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970). 
191. "A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding, 
... and it is unlikely that psychiatric assistance ... would be of probable value in cases where it is 
not." 470 U.S. at 82. 
192. 470 U.S. at 83. At another point the Court stated the condition as: "When the defend-
ant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a 
significant factor in his defense .... " 470 U.S. at 82-83. 
193. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 664-65. Some courts and commentators have 
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issue exists, no further particularized showing is necessary. This stan-
dard should be a workable one in many cases (subject to a caveat con-
cerning preliminary assistance, discussed below). 194 In addition to 
providing a psychiatrist when insanity is in issue, this standard entitles 
the defendant, for example, to a handwriting expert when there is a 
question of forgery, a pathologist if cause of death is an issue, an arson 
investigator concerning the cause of a fire, or a ballistics expert if the 
origin of a bullet is subject to dispute. 195 
While Ake's "presumed need" test is best adapted to meet the re-
quirements of due process in most cases, there are some situations 
where it would be difficult to apply. For example, defense counsel fre-
quently needs a general criminal investigator to locate and interview 
witnesses and otherwise assist in the discovery of facts. 196 Often, it is 
difficult to identify specific issues from which a "presumed need" for 
an investigator would arise. Rather, the need for an investigator is 
dictated by the specific circumstances of the case. Similarly, where the 
defense requests the assistance of an expert whose testimony would be 
inadmissible at trial, 197 use of the "presumed need" test is difficult. 
In such circumstances, there are at least two other tests to which 
the courts could turn for guidance. One could be called the "equal 
protection" test: an expert should be provided when defense counsel 
in similar circumstances would hire an expert for a client able to pay. 
Some federal courts have used such a test in applying the "necessary 
suggested that an expert should be supplied only when the issue is "pivotal," i.e., when it, alone, 
is dispositive of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 18, 258 A.2d 889, 891 (1969); Note, 
supra note 35, at 148-51; cf. Gardner, supra note 113, at 114. While it is true that such a distinc· 
tion may affect the "third prong" of the Mathews balancing test, Note, supra note 35, at 149-50, 
it should not do so decisively. If a given question is indeed at issue in the trial, the "third-prong" 
interest in accurate determination should still carry sufficient "weight," together with the indi· 
vidual defendant's interest, to outweigh the government's minimal fiscal interest. 
194. See notes 216-18 infra and accompanying text. 
195. There remains the question of what must be shown to demonstrate that a relevant issue 
exists. The Supreme Court has held that mere "undeveloped assertions that the requested assist· 
ance would be beneficial" are insufficient, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 n.l 
(1985), and the Fifth Circuit has refused to read Ake to mean that a defendant's sanity is always a 
"siguificant factor'' when he pleads insanity; rather, a "factual showing" that sanity is an issue 
must be made. Volson v. Blackbum, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (1986). On the other hand, it appears 
that courts reluctant to provide an expert may find it easy to cite boilerplate language to the effect 
that no showing of a real issue has been made. See, e.g., Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025, 1033-34 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (Bussey, J.), where the court declined to provide a defense psychiatrist 
on the ground that "appellant failed to show cause for doubting his sanity." 702 P.2d at 1034. 
The court rejected the contention that "the fact appellant was placed on psychotrophic [sic] 
drugs at the State mental hospital [was] sufficient to raise doubts as to his mental state," declar-
ing that "[t]his case is much different than that of Ake •... " 702 P.2d at 1034. It may be noted 
that the same court had found in 1983 that Glen Burton Ake had "clearly failed to establish any 
reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 
1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (Bussey, J.). 
196. See note 103 supra. 
197. See note 99 supra. 
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for an adequate defense" language of the Criminal Justice Act. 19 8 
While the Supreme Court has most recently retreated from use of an 
equal protection approach in indigents' rights cases, 199 the question 
posed here may nonetheless help courts in their thinking about the 
circumstances under which an expert is required.200 
The second "supplemental" test might be called the "third-prong" 
test, after the only real variable in the Ake Court's application of the 
Mathews v. Eldridge due process balancing test. 201 The "third prong" 
examines "the probable value of the [expert] assistance sought, and the 
risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not offered. "202 
Rephrasing and simplifying slightly, one can say that an expert should 
be provided to the defendant where doing so would significantly in-
crease the probability of an accurate verdict.203 
In addition to the above tests, an additional standard should apply 
where relevant: the defense should be placed on a level of equality 
with the prosecution, in that it should automatically be entitled to 
whatever experts are used by the prosecution.204 Here, the defendant 
would be required to make no preliminary showing at all. Rather, the 
"presumed need" threshold test205 would be met by the prosecution's 
determination that an issue requiring expert assistance did exist.206 
Such a provision is particularly necessary because of the importance of 
expert assistance to the cross-examination of the prosecution ex-
perts.207 For this reason, it may find special constitutional justification 
198. See, e.g., Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 
(1973). 
199. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text. 
200. "[B]oth the type of aid typically secured by defendants of means in similar cases and the 
amount being expended on the case by the prosecution might be viewed as evidentiary facts to be 
weighed in determining whether the proceeding is likely to fulfill the due process requirement of 
'fairness.'" Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1075 (footnotes omitted). 
201. See text at notes 41-42 supra. 
202. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79. The Court disposed rather summarily of the first two factors, the 
private interest and the state's interest, and devoted most of its analysis to the third prong. In 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), what is here called the "third prong" was dis-
cussed second, before the discussion of the governmental interest involved. Perhaps Justice Mar-
shall reversed the order in Ake in order to highlight the importance of the "risk of error" 
variable. 
203. The favored "presumed need" standard results from application of this "third-prong" 
test, together with a preference for per se rules over a case-by-case approach. On Ake's adoption 
of a per se rule, and the desirability of such an approach, see note 63 supra. 
204. Cf Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1075, quoted at note 200 supra. 
205. See notes 193-95 supra and accompanying text. 
206. This test should not be construed in the reverse sense to deny the defendant an expert 
where the prosecution does not use one, as the defense might well need an expert which the 
prosecution would not otherwise employ. The best example would be that of a psychiatrist for 
assertion of an insanity defense in jurisdictions which place the burden of showing insanity on the 
defendant. 
207. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. It is difficult to see how the court could deny a defense serolo-
gist in Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985), 
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in the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. 208 It would also apply 
when the prosecution presented multiple experts on an issue; the de-
fense would be entitled to the same number.209 The Ake Court, in 
fact, applied a special case of the "equality with the prosecution" rule 
in its secondary holding that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of 
a psychiatrist when the state, in the sentencing phase of a capital case, 
presents expert psychiatric evidence210 of the defendant's future dan-
gerousness as an aggravating factor.211 
An alternate, and much simpler, system for determining when an 
indigent defendant is entitled to expert assistance is to leave this deci-
sion to the discretion of defense counsel, whether public defender or 
assigned counsel, subject perhaps to review by the court for abuse of 
discretion.212 It has been suggested that counsel's desire to remain on 
good terms with the court would be sufficient to prevent excessive use 
of expert assistance.213 Such a procedure is certainly attractive for its 
simplicity and especially for its potential for eliminating abuse by 
courts bent on denying assistance.214 At the same time it might pose a 
danger of conflicts of interest on the part of the defense attorneys, 
leading to excessive self-restraint. It may be better to retain a proce-
dure under which counsel plays the role of advocate, rather than 
judge.21s 
where the prosecution relied on testimony of a serologist, and defense counsel "had no expertise 
in the field of blood groupings." The court's objection that the defense had made no "showing as 
to what manner counsel expected to be assisted in cross-examining the witness" is unconvincing, 
as it would have been difficult for counsel to make such a showing in the absence of some expert 
assistance. See also State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985) (de· 
fense ballistics expert denied despite prosecution reliance on testimony of a ballistics expert). 
208. See text at notes 80-81 supra. Arguably, at least this test- and perhaps the others -
should also support a requirement that the state provide expert assistance for a nonindigcnt 
defendant with retained counsel, where the cost of such assistance goes beyond her means. See 
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusncE, supra note 3, at 7-8 (viewing "poverty" as a 
relative concept). Such a procedure is possible at the federal level under the Criminal Justice Act 
of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1982); see Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.13[2] & 1986 Supplement at 
229. This issue would be particularly acute when the prosecution presented numerous experts, 
completely overwhelming the ability of most defendants to compete on an equal footing. 
209. "[l]n a contested trial •.• the number of experts may be as important as what the 
experts say." A. MATTHEWS, supra note 162, at 41. 
210. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, 470 U.S. at 92, the testimony regarding Ake's 
future dangerousness was obtained from psychiatrists (who had examined him at the state hospi· 
tal in regard to present sanity) called as defense witnesses during the guilt phase. 
211. 470 U.S. 83-84. Presumably, the general Ake rule would, in appropriate cases, entitle 
the defendant to expert assistance in the sentencing phase as well as the guilt phase, even where 
the prosecution did not activate the special rule through presentation of expert evidence. 
212. See Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1077. 
213. Id. 
214. Cf note 195 supra. 
215. Cf Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), where the Court struck down a system under 
which the public defender made the decision as to whether an indigent defendant could receive a 
trial transcript for appeal. Making counsel's decision reviewable by the court would be a partial 
solution, Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1077 n.125 (citing Lane, 372 U.S. at 486 (Harlan, 
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In all but the last two of the standards discussed above, some pre-
liminary showing by the defendant is required in order to obtain ac-
cess to an expert. In order to meet this threshold test, however, some 
preliminary assistance of an expert will often be necessary, in order to 
permit determination of whether a valid issue exists, whether full-
scale assistance is necessary, and, if so, to prepare the motion for 
expert assistance.216 Therefore, a threshold level of expert assistance217 
should be available to the indigent defendant virtually automat-
ically. 21s 
Finally, there is the question of how the preliminary showing is to 
be made. Ake suggests that this be done through an ex parte proce-
dure, 219 and there are good reasons for this. A public hearing on the 
need for an expert witness would in effect require the defense to dis-
close its strategy and tactics to the prosecution. "[T]here could be no 
justification for such disclosure becoming an automatic discovery de-
vice for the prosecution solely because of the defendant's indi-
gency ."220 Thus, the showing of need for an expert must be done in 
J., concurring)), but one wonders about the practicality of a system in which a defendant must 
ask the court to review the actions of his own counsel. 
216. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note17, at 663-64. Cf Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.15[3]: 
Courts should of course be lenient in the factual showing required [under the federal Crimi-
nal Justice Act] to establish the need for a psychiatric examination, since this is the kind of 
esoteric question on which a persuasive showing of need may be impossible without the aid 
of the medical services being sought. 
See also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 1986) (indigent defendant without a 
psychiatrist is handicapped in showing sufficient doubt of sanity to obtain a competency hearing). 
In State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112, 498 A.2d 330, 334 (1985), the court suggested that 
defense counsel, in order to be able to articulate a basis for the requested assistance, "have some 
preliminary conversation with the expert, who can indicate such possibilities offruitful inquiry as 
he then foresees." Apparently the court did not consider the possibility that the expert might 
expect to be paid for such "preliminary conversation." 
217. A good model for courts to follow may be the federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(e)(2) (1982), under which up to $150 of "threshold funds" is available to the defense 
counsel without prior approval. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 664. 
218. The American Bar Association's CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 
§ 7-3.3(a) (1984) provides that in the case of a defense request for a psychiatrist to evaluate the 
defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, "[t]he court should grant the defense motion 
as a matter of course unless the court determines that the motion has no foundation." In a post-
Ake case dealing with this issue, the Supreme Court of Georgia suggested that the trial court, at 
the defendant's request, appoint a psychiatrist or other mental health expert "to examine the 
defendant in order to determine whether his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his de-
fense." In case of a positive determination, the court must provide the defendant with a psychia-
trist to assist in his defense. Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 448-49, 330 S.E.2d 563, 566-67 
(1985). Where such a procedure is followed, however, it is important that the examination be 
limited to determining whether or not insanity is likely to be a significant issue, and not whether 
the defendant was sane. Where the latter issue becomes the focus of the examination - as in 
Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (1985); Satterwhite v. State, 697 
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); or United States v. Hansford, No. 85-5508 (4th Cir. Feb. 
27, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) - the result is that a "neutral" 
expert decides the question (if she finds the defendant sane), thus denying the defense the "parti-
san" expert mandated by Ake. See Part IV supra. 
219. 470 U.S. at 82-83. 
_220. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 662. Procedure under the federal Criminal Jus-
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such a manner as not to inform the prosecution of defense plans which 
would otherwise remain confidential. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most surprising fact about Ake v. Oklahoma is that it 
was decided only in 1985. Supreme Court recognition of the indigent 
defendant's right to the assistance of experts was long overdue. There 
will doubtless be further judicial battles before this right is fully real-
ized. Ake dealt specifically with the right to a psychiatrist for an in-
sanity defense, but its logic must lead to the recognition of a 
constitutional right, where a minimum showing of need has been 
made, in capital and noncapital cases alike, to the assistance as "de-
fense consultants" of all types of experts needed to provide the "basic 
tools of an adequate defense."221 
- John M. West 
tice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), is for an ex parte hearing, but the defense attorney is 
not always assured that information contained in her application will be kept from the prosecu-
tion. See Oaks, supra note 15, at § 7.15[3]. A solution, practiced in some districts, permits 
counsel to request that the court seal the application materials after a decision on the application 
has been made. Id.; Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 662-63. 
221. Ake, 410 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). 
